UNLV Retrospective Theses & Dissertations
1-1-2007

Examining the cognitive theory of depression using Descriptive
Experience Sampling
Jedidiah D Gunter
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/rtds

Repository Citation
Gunter, Jedidiah D, "Examining the cognitive theory of depression using Descriptive Experience Sampling"
(2007). UNLV Retrospective Theses & Dissertations. 2289.
http://dx.doi.org/10.25669/7vzt-qyg5

This Thesis is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by Digital Scholarship@UNLV
with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Thesis in any way that is permitted by the
copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from
the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/
or on the work itself.
This Thesis has been accepted for inclusion in UNLV Retrospective Theses & Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of Digital Scholarship@UNLV. For more information, please contact digitalscholarship@unlv.edu.

EXAMINING THE COGNITIVE THEORY OF
DEPRESSION USING DESCRIPTIVE
EXPERIENCE SAMPLING

By

Jedidiah D. Gunter
Bachelor of Arts
University of California, Los Angeles
2004

A thesis defense submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the

M aster of Arts Degree in Psychology
D epartm ent of Psychology
College of Liberal Arts

G raduate College
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
May 2008

UMI Number: 1456338

INFORMATION TO USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy
submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and
photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper
alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized
copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

UMI
UMI Microform 1456338
Copyright 2008 by ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

ProQuest LLC
789 E. Eisenhower Parkway
PC Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346

UNiy

Thesis Approval
The Graduate College
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Fall

■

The Thesis prepared by
J e d id ia h G unter

Entitled
Examining the Cognitive Theory of Depression Using Descriptive
Experience Sampling

is approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
M aster o f A r ts

Examination Com m itteejSnair

Dean of the Graduate College

Examination Qom m ittee M em ber

-examination Com mittee M em ber

Examination Co

Graduate College F a d ilty Representative

11

20 07

ABSTRACT

Examining the Cognitive Theory of Depression Using Descriptive Experience
Sampling
by
Jedidiah Gunter
Dr. Christopher Heavey
Professor of Psychology
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas
The goal of this study was to examine the experience of depressed and nondepressed
individuals, exploring the extent to which the specific constructs identified in Beck’s
cognitive theory of depression were differentially reflected in the momentary experiences
of depressed individuals. This involved recruiting depressed and nondepressed
individuals and then assessing their inner experience using both the traditional
questionnaire measures developed in accord with Beck’s theory and Descriptive
Experience Sampling. Depressed participants showed substantial variability in the nature
of their inner experience, had less frequent inner speech and more feelings than
nondepressed participants. Salient characteristics found in the depressed participants’
sampled moments were depressive content, depressive feelings, anxiety content, anxiety
feelings, and a propensity for overall negative experiences. Participants’ overall scores
on the questionnaires correlated with the corresponding rated construct on the following:
depressive content, the cognitive triad, and automatic thoughts. Further analyses
suggested that these constructs were highly intercorrelated.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
According to the DSM-IV (2000), the main feature of major depression is either an
unpleasant mood (feeling sad or irritable) or a loss of pleasure in enjoyable activities. In
order to receive a diagnosis of a major depressive episode, symptoms must persist for
most of the day, nearly everyday, for at least a two-week period. In addition to the
individuals meeting one o f the main features, a diagnosis is appropriate if the individual
experiences four or more o f the following symptoms: significant weight loss or weight
gain; insomnia or hypersomnia; psychomotor agitation or retardation; fatigue or loss of
energy; feelings of worthlessness or inappropriate/excessive guilt; lack of concentration;
or recurrent thoughts of suicide.
According to the World Health Organization (2001) depression currently affects more
than 121 million people worldwide. When depressive symptoms are exacerbated it may
lead to a person committing suicide. Depression also has a significant monetary effect on
society in terms of work related loss of production and health services provided.
Greenberg et al. (2003) estimated that the annual workplace cost of major depression due
to work absences and productivity reductions in the US labor force is $52 billion.
Additionally, $26 billion is spent on health services treating depression.

One of the reasons that so many hours are lost and treatment o f the disorder is so
costly is that the time to recuperate from the symptoms is extensive. Depressive
symptoms usually develop over days or weeks and may last for months at a
subsyndromal level before escalating to a full major depressive episode (DSM-IV, 2000).
Major depressive episodes are variable in duration. An untreated episode typically lasts
four months or longer (Kessler et al., 2003; DSM-IV, 2000). For the most part,
individuals who experience a major depressive episode return to normal functioning and
have a complete remission of symptoms (DSM-IV, 2000). In about a quarter of the
cases, some depressive symptoms may persist but not be serious enough to meet full
criteria for a major depressive episode. Some individuals (5%-10%) continue to meet full
criteria for two or more years (DSM-IV, 2000).
Epidemiological studies have revealed recently that up to 17% of individuals will
experience a major depressive episode at some point in their life (Kessler et al., 2003). Oneyear prevalence of a major depressive episode was determined to be 6.6% (Kessler et al.,
2003). Women are at a significantly greater risk to develop a major depressive episode with
studies reporting that episodes occur nearly twice as often in women as in men (Culbertson,
1997; Kessler et al., 2003). Additionally the DSM-IV reports that lifetime risk for Major
Depressive Disorder is 10%-25% for women and from 5%-12% for men. Point prevalence
has varied from 5%-9% for women and 2%-3% for men. Depressive symptoms can begin at
any age, but typically onset is in the mid 20’s, often following a severe psychosocial stressor
(DSM-IV, 2000).
As a measure o f the impact of various illnesses, the World Health Organization has
developed the concept o f disability adjusted life years. Disability adjusted life years account

for the sum of years of potential life lost due to premature mortality and the years o f
productive life lost due to disability. As it stands, depression is ranked second in terms of
disability adjusted life years among 15-44 year olds and is projected to rank second to
cardiovascular conditions for all ages by the year 2020 (WHO, 2005). In the year o f 1996
there were 1.37 million years lost due to depression in the United States. Additionally, these
rates may be higher than what is actually reported because people experiencing other
psychological disorders may also have symptoms.
Major depression is highly comorbid with other disorders as evidenced by reports of at
least one other DSM-IV disorder being assessed in nearly three-fourths of respondents with a
lifetime major depressive disorder (Kessler et al., 2003). The disorders that are mostly
associated with major depression are anxiety disorders at a rate of 59% over the lifetime. In
addition substance abuse disorders (24%) and impulse control disorders (30%) are often
comorbid with a major depression episode (Kessler et al., 2003).
To date, psychological and biological theories have been unable to explain completely
how depression develops. One of the leading theories explaining the onset and maintenance
of depression is Beck’s cognitive theory of depression (1967). This theory posits that
negative thinking plays a central causal role to depression. This theory was developed based
on cognitive symptoms of depression preceding the affective and mood symptoms of
depression. It has been researched and tested over four decades and, as a result, numerous
paper and pencil measures (Beck’s Depression Inventory; Beck et al. 1961; Cognitive Triad
Inventory; Beckham, 1986; Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale; Weissman & Beck, 1978;
Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire; Hollon & Kendall, 1980) have been developed to assess
the hypothesized cognitive precursors and underpinnings of depression. Components of

Beck’s cognitive theory o f depression have since been validated primarily with
questionnaires involving retrospective memory with participants who are depressed.
The questionnaire methodology is potentially problematic because research has shown
that participants who are experiencing psychological symptoms make errors and distortions
in their recall o f events or feelings (e.g., Lewinsohn & Rosenbaum, 1987; Kalska, Punamaki
& Makinen-Pelli, 1999; Wells, & Horwood, 2004). Given the inherent limitations of the
methods used to validate the cognitive theory of depression, it is desirable to examine this
theory using other methods less vulnerable to errors in recall. Descriptive Experience
Sampling (DES; Hurlburt, 1990, 1993) is a method that minimizes the retrospectiveness of
the recall. DES minimizes the retrospectiveness of the recall by examining random moments
of experience soon after they occur. In DES, participants are randomly cued by a beeper to
pay attention to particular moments o f experience. Then they write down notes about their
experience at the moment of the beep and are interviewed about these moments within 24
hours. The goal of these interviews is to develop accurate descriptions of the sampled
moments of experience. DES has been used with participants experiencing abnormal
psychological symptoms and participants who are not (e.g., Hurlburt, 1990, 1993, Hurlburt &
Happe’, 1994).
This study will employ Descriptive Experience Sampling to investigate the central
components of Beck’s cognitive theory of depression. This will involve recruiting samples
of depressed and nondepressed individuals and then assessing their experience using both the
traditional measures developed in accord with Beck’s theory and Descriptive Experience
Sampling. This will allow the examination of the extent to which these methods converge or
diverge with regard to the nature of experience in individuals suffering fi-om depression.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW
Cognitive Theory of Depression
Over the past 40 years multiple models have been proposed to explain how people
become depressed and continue to experience depressive symptoms over extended
periods o f time. Examples of these models include the catecholamine (Schildkraut,
1965), cognitive (Beck, 1967), behavioral (Lewinsohn, 1974), learned helplessness
(Seligman, 1975), self-control (Rehm, 1977), and ruminative response (Nolen-Hoeksema,
1991) models. However, recent theory and research have increasingly focused on the
role of cognition in the etiology, maintenance, and treatment of depression. Beck’s
cognitive theory o f depression (1967) states that depression is activated and maintained
by way of distortions in the individual’s thinking patterns. These distortions are a result
of four different components of a person’s thinking. The four components that comprise
Beck’s theory are depressive self-schemas, cognitive triad of thinking, distortions and
biases, and negative automatic thoughts.
Depressive Self-Schemas
According to Beck (1964), a schema is a mental model that allows us to process and
organize incoming information efficiently. For example, when a driver comes across a
stop sign, the immediate response is to slow down and come to a stop. Instead of having
to stop and think “What does the stop sign mean?”, the person has stored in his memory

the relevant response sequence. The sequence to apply the foot to the brake and come to a
stop is his or her schema for what to do when arriving at a stop sign. This reaction, as
well as beliefs and past experiences with stop signs is stored in long-term memory. This
memory contains feedback concerning an individual’s attributes and abilities triggered by
stimuli that set off automatic scripts and behavioral action sequences that help us respond
rapidly across situations.
The schemas that are self-focused and unique to the individual are referred to as self
schemas. A reason for repetitive patterns in an individual’s thought content is self
schemas. They are not directly observable but are regarded as hypothetical constructs.
When stimuli activate a particular schema, the schema abstracts and shapes the raw data
into thoughts or cognitions. The content o f the schemas are usually in the form of
generalizations and represent the individual’s attitudes, goals, values, and ideas.
Schemas range in complexity within the individual. When an individual activates his
or her definition of what a basketball is they may be able to describe it in simple
linguistic categories. However, when dealing with abstract concepts such as an
individual’s judgment o f other’s attitudes toward him, the schema may include complex
taxonomic systems in addition to structuralized logical elements consisting of premises,
assumptions, and syllogisms. For example, a person who has the view that everybody
dislikes him will tend to interpret other’s reactions based on this assumption. These types
o f dysfunctional schemas are involved in the inaccuracies, misinterpretations, and
distortions involved in psychopathology.
Self-schemas are developed over time in the individual beginning in early childhood
(Millon & Blaney, 1999). Once a schema has developed, it becomes ingrained in the

person and is resistant to change (Beck, 1964). In psychopathology, the orderly matching
of stimulus and schema breaks down because of the intrusion of hyperactive idiosyncratic
schemas (Beck, 1964). Because of their greater strength, these psychopathological
schemas tend to displace the more appropriate schemas, resulting in interpretations that
deviate from reality (Beck, 1964). Beck theorized that the increasing frequency and
degree o f cognitive distortion as depression develops might be attributable to the
progressive dominance o f idiosyncratic schemas. As these schemas become more active,
they are capable of being evoked by stimuli that are less congruent with them. So rather
than interpreting a certain stimulus the way it is perceived by most in the environment,
the negative schema will select congruent information from the stimulus and mold the
information to fit the negative schema. The result is a distortion in reality. These
negative self-schemas become very strong during depression, dominate the thought
processes, and help contribute to cognitive distortions. This helps explain why it is
difficult to change a depressed person’s rigid pattern of thinking. All types of individuals
are susceptible to developing depressive self-schemas.
Depressive self-schemas are activated and developed through social stressors, which
contribute to the initiation and maintenance of episodes of psychiatric disorders (Beck,
1967). For instance, a person will encounter a stimulus, which evokes a self-schema, and
leads to the specific cognition for the event (Beck, 1964). As an example, John has a
strong self-schema about academic tests that represents thinking such as, “I have failed
tests in the past and will fail tests in the future.” John will likely activate that self-schema
when he encounters any testing situation. Once a person has developed a strong
depressive self-schema, the schema becomes very resistant to change and may dominate

other schemas that have previously been constructive in a given situation. John, who
activates the self-schema of failing academic tests, may activate this same self-schema in
other ’’test” situations such as athletic competitions or meeting new people. Once a
pattern of depressive self-schemas overtakes the individual’s cognitions for the majority
of situations they encounter, it leads to the activation and maintenance of depressive
symptoms. In addition to depressive self-schemas being developed, there are usually
depressive themes that emerge in the patterns of a depressed person’s cognitions (Beck,
1964). These themes take three forms, which are referred to as the Cognitive Triad o f
Thinking.
Cognitive Triad of Thinking
According to the Cognitive Triad of Thinking theory, a depressed person will
interpret their experiences about themselves, their environment, and predictions about the
future in a depressive manner, such as personal deficiency, self-blame, and negative
expectations (Beck, 1964). Accordingly, people who are experiencing depression
regularly feel defeated or deprived in their experiences, feel inadequate, and often see the
future as bleak. A number of researchers have conducted studies that suggest these
components are in fact an integral part of a person’s cognitions.
For example, Slife and Weaver (1992) studied the ability of depressed and non
depressed participants to perform various tasks. They examined three specific tasks: the
ability to answer certain types of math problems accurately (cognitive skill); the ability to
predict one's ability to answer the problems accurately (metacognitive knowledge about
cognition); and the ability to rate accurately one's performance after attempting to answer
the problems (metacognitive monitoring of cognitive performance). They found that

depressed participants did worse than non-depressed participants on both types of
metacognitive tasks but not on cognitive ability. In other words, depressed participants
underestimated their ability to answer problems accurately and after completing the
problems, they also tended to underestimate their success.
Bargh and Tota (1988) examined the existence of automatic negative self-referential
thoughts in depressed and non-depressed participants by using the concurrent memory
load paradigm. Participants judged a series of depressed and nondepressed content
adjectives as to whether they described the self or whether they described the average
person. An adjective would be presented and one of four types of decisions would be
requested: structural (contains a certain letter); semantic (means the same as the word
presented); other descriptive (describes average person); or self-descriptive (describes
self). During each judgment, half of the participants were required to hold six digits in
working memory. The depressed participants who had to hold digits in their memory
were found to have greater self-referential judgment latencies for depressed content
compared with nondepressed content, whereas the reverse pattern was found for
nondepressed participants. While retaining numbers, all participants had smaller
latencies on other-referential judgment for nondepressed content adjectives than for
depressed-content adjectives. The authors suggest that these results indicate that
depressed people exhibit an automatic, unintentional use of negative social constructs in
self-perception but not in other perception, suggesting a context dependent form or
automatic processing.
Lewinsohn and Rosenbaum (1987) examined whether depressed participants’ recall
of parental behavior is a stable characteristic that remains even during asymptomatic

periods. Groups of participants included: depressed, remitted depressed who had a
history o f depression but were not depressed during the study, participants who became
depressed during the follow-up period, and never-depressed. The depressed group
differed from the nondepressed group in recall of parental behavior. More specifically,
depressed individuals recalled their parents as having been more emotionally rejecting.
The remitted depressed did not differ from the nondepressed controls in their recall of
parental behavior. These results suggest that recall of one’s parents as unloving and
rejecting is not a stable characteristic of depression-prone individuals, but rather occurs
only while depressed. This supports Beck’s contention that depressed people have an
overly negative view of their environment. More specifically, depressives’ negative
schemas influence evaluations of parent’s behavior.
Andersen, Speilman, and Bargh (1992) studied whether depressed participants make
predictions about the future based on pessimistic future-event schema. Participants were
undergraduates varying in levels of depression on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI).
Overall, 36 nondepressed, 15 mildly depressed, and 17 moderately depressed participants
predicted whether positive (e.g., achieve life goals, listen to music) and negative (e.g., get
a fatal disease, go blind) events would happen to them or the average person in the future.
In addition, half of the participants were required to hold a number in their working
memory. The moderately depressive participant group predicted more negative events
and fewer positive events than did other groups and showed greater automaticy in their
predictions. The attentional load did not increase depressive participant’s response
latencies for either type o f events, but did for the mildly and nondepressed group.
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In addition, Brown, Hammen, Craske, and Wickens (1995) studied the attitudes o f
college students receiving poorer-than-expected exam scores. Participants were required
to complete the BDI and Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale prior to midterm examinations
and just the BDI after receiving their grades. The study found that students with high
dysfunctional attitudes score coupled with stress (exam) endorsed items consistent with
depressive symptomatology. This suggests that the students who are experiencing high
levels o f dysfunctional attitudes and stress have negative thoughts about themselves (e.g.,
they do not deserve to be in college), their future (e.g., they may not pass the class), and
the world (e.g., they are going to fail all their classes).
Distortions and Biases
As discussed, depressive self-schemas lead to patterns of thinking that are consistent
with the cognitive triad o f thinking. However, Beck further believed that such self
schemas lead to distortions and biases in cognitive processing. People experiencing
depressive symptoms are prone to committing a variety o f errors and distortions in
cognitive reasoning. Beck identified four general categories of distortions and biases in
depressive participants: arbitrary inference, selective abstraction, overgeneralization, and
minimization and magnification (Beck, 1964).
Arbitrary inference refers to tendencies to draw negative conclusions without support
for those conclusions. A person experiencing depression may exhibit arbitrary inferences
in various situations that they encounter in their daily routines. For example, Mary, who
is depressed, may incorrectly conclude after a brief conversation with a fiiend that the
friend does not want to chat because Mary is boring and dull.
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Another cognitive error identified by Beck is selective abstraction. Selective
abstraction refers to cognitions by an individual that focus on the negative in a situation
while disregarding the rest o f the context. For example, depressed participant Fred may
score 99 out of a 100 on a test, but feel and experience failure for missing the one point.
Overgeneralization refers to a tendency to assume that failure at one task predisposes
one to fail at all related/similar tasks encountered. For example. Shelly fails the first time
she attempts to surf and then assumes that she will never be successful in the future at
surfing or any other similar activity such as snowboarding or skateboarding.
Minimizing and magnifying events is another component of the distorted pattern of
thinking that has emerged in the depressed individual. Minimizing events refers to the
trend for individuals to give themselves little credit for accomplishing a difficult task. For
instance, Steven receives an ‘A’ on a class final, but instead of being elated with his
performance, assumes that the test must have been so easy that everyone else received an
‘A ’ as well. Magnifying events is just the opposite. A depressed individual may
experience a minor setback but consider it a huge issue. For example, the afore
mentioned Steven does poorly on a minor quiz, but interprets it as a likely indicator that
he will fail the class.
Support for these negative bias constructs comes from research that focuses on
retrospective recall. Although some of these studies do not fit perfectly with the specific
categories, they nonetheless are consistent with what Beck has theorized. Lewis (1995)
compared the responses of depressed adolescents to a control group with regard to
dysfunctional cognitions (catastrophizing, selective abstraction, personalization, and
overgeneralization), perceived social support (family and fiiend) and stressful events
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(negative major events and daily hassles). Lewis found that depressed adolescents
reported less perceived family social support, more stressful major events, and more
negative personalizing cognitions than the control group.
Gotlib (1981) compared the reactions of depressed and nondepressed psychiatric
inpatients with a control group. Participants were administered the BDI, the Hamilton
Rating Scale for depression, and a verbal recognition task. The verbal recognition task
was designed to elicit participant’s recall of self-reinforcements and self-punishments. In
general, the depressed and nondepressed inpatients gave themselves fewer self
reinforcements and a greater number of positive reinforcements than did the control
group. The depressed and nondepressed group did not differ on those measures.
However, when recall o f reinforcement and punishment was assessed, depressed
participants recalled giving themselves fewer reinforcements and recalled giving
themselves greater number o f punishments than was actually the case. This differed from
the nondepressed and control participants. The author suggested that a low rate of self
reinforcement may be a characteristic of global psychopathology, but deficits in the recall
of self-punishment and self-reinforcement were specific to depression. This suggests that
individuals suffering from depression selectively abstract details of events that are
consistent with their current affect.
Epstein’s (1992) study with different levels of constructive thinkers lends support to
the overgeneralization concept. He used different levels of constructive thinking because
he has found that good and poor constructive thinkers can do as well on the same task.
However, he observed that poor constructive thinkers judged themselves more harshly,
exhibited more negative affect, and during a recovery period exhibited increased physical
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arousal, which was attributed to the intrusion of negative self-attributions. Decreased
physical arousal was observed in good constructive thinkers. In addition, Epstein has
observed that following unfavorable outcomes, poor constructive thinkers are highly
prone to making broad negative attributions about themselves. In his study, he compared
answers o f three groups of participants differing in general coping ability, as measured by
the Constructive Thinking Inventory, to situations that differed according to whether the
outcomes were positive or negative and directed at the self or at others. He found that all
participants displayed positive overgeneralizations to favorable outcomes, but poor
constructive thinkers reported more negative overgeneralizations than others following
unfavorable outcomes. In addition, Edelman, Ahrens, and Haaga (1994) studied
undergraduates’ depression levels over time by monitoring their responses on the BDI
and an overgeneralization questionnaire. After a three-week period, they found that the
group of people who initially overgeneralized negatively most in response to negative
events had more depressive symptoms.
Wenzlaff and Grozier (1988) studied depressed and non-depressed participants to
determine how the participants would predict their future success in general based on the
results of a test of social perceptiveness. The success or failure on social perceptiveness
was predetermined for the participants. The participants indicated the degree they
possessed various personality traits and the importance that they possessed various
personality traits (social perceptiveness). The results indicated that depressed participants
exaggerated the importance o f social perceptiveness after learning they had done badly
on a test assumed to measure that attribute. In contrast, nondepressed participants
inflated social perceptiveness after doing well on the test. Additionally, after learning
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they had done poorly on a test o f social perceptiveness, depressed participants also
believed they were generally less proficient (e.g., successful, skilled, optimistic, positive,
competent, intelligent). The results suggest that people experiencing depression magnify
negative personal feedback in a way that tends to be self-critical. The authors suggested
that these failure experiences lead the individuals to inflate the importance of the failed
endeavor. Over time, this tendency could lead to an increasingly large list of important
failures, thereby undermining depressed individuals' sense o f personal adequacy. The
large list of failures could further contribute to the development o f a negative selfconcept.
Negative Automatic Thoughts
The last component of Beck’s cognitive theory of depression is the tendency for
depressed individuals to experience excessive negative automatic thoughts, which tend to
reinforce their depression. Automatic thoughts are the beliefs and meanings assigned to
events. These can be thoughts about worthlessness or hopelessness, or general self
derogatory beliefs or reenactments of past failures or stressful situations. These thoughts
may occur frequently in depressed participants and can be difficult to control. Bates,
Thompson, and Flanagan, (1999) studied non-depressed patients to determine how
repetitive negative thoughts affected them. Participants were randomly assigned to either
a depressive or a neutral mood condition. They were asked to read aloud each of 30
negative statements and then to try to feel the mood suggested by the statement. Those
who read numerous negative statements about themselves became increasingly
depressed. The authors took this as suggesting that repetitive negative automatic
thoughts can induce a depressive state within an individual.
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Questionnaires for Assessing the Cognitive Theory of Depression
A variety o f questionnaires, such as Beck’s Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et al.
1961), the Cognitive Triad Inventory (CTI; Beckham, 1986), the Dysfunctional Attitudes
Scale (DAS; Weissman & Beck, 1978), and the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire
(ATQ; Hollon & Kendall, 1980), have been used to measure depressive thinking style
and inner experience related to different aspects o f Beck’s theory o f depression. The BDI
and the ATQ involve retrospective reports whereas the CTI and the DAS assess present
state of mind.
The BDI (Beck et al., 1961) is designed to be a direct reflection of a participant’s
inner experience. This paper and pencil test is used to assess affective, behavioral,
cognitive, and motivational aspects of depression. It is intended for use with adults and
adolescents 13 years or age and older. The BDI is not intended for diagnosis, but rather
to aid in identifying the presence and severity of symptoms consistent with the DSM
(Schaefer et al., 1985; Roberts, Lewinsohn & Seeley, 1991). Participants are to circle the
statement that best describes them over the past two weeks. The BDI consists of 21 items
and responses are based on a four point Likert scale ranging from zero (e.g., I do not feel
sad) to three (e.g., I am so sad or unhappy that I cannot stand it). Total scores of 0-13 are
considered minimal range, 14-19 reflects mild depression, 20-28 reflects moderate
depression, and 29-63 reflects severe depression. The BDI has changed since its
inception in 1961 from a psychologist administered test to a client-administered test in
1978. The BDI was revised in 1996 and renamed the Beck Depression Inventory-II
(BDI-II). The BDI has been widely tested for validity and reliability.
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The effectiveness o f the BDI and BDI-II has been validated by several studies:
Richter, Werner, and Heerlein (1998) concluded that the BDI had good content validity;
Beck, Steer & Garbin (1988) assessed concurrent validity; Yin and Fan (2000) and Beck
and Steer (1984) assessed its internal consistency and test-retest reliability. Storch,
Roberti, and Roth (2004) concluded that the BDI-II has also shown good concurrent
validity and Sprinkle, Lurie and Insko (2002) measured its test-retest reliability. The BDI
has also been shown to be effective with several different cultures in several studies: for
example, the Brazilian-Chinese population by Wang, Andrade, and Gorenstein (2005);
African Americans by Grothe, Dutton, and Jones (2005); South Africans by Ward,
Flisher, and Zissis (2004); Japanese by Kojima, Furukawa, and Takahashi (2002); and
Hungarians by Rozsa, Szadoczky, and Füredi (2001). In addition, the BDI has been
translated into other languages such as French, Dutch, and Spanish. It has been reliably
used with adolescents (Canals, Blade, & Carbajo, 2001), adults (Beck, 1967), older adults
(Steer, Cavalieri, & Leonard, 1999), and clinically diagnosed adults (Johnson, Crofton, &
Feinstein, 1996).
While the BDI was designed to measure global depression within an individual, the
Cognitive Triad Inventory (CTI; Beckham, 1986) was designed to measure three specific
constructs (view of self, world, and future) that are associated with Beck’s Cognitive
Triad. The CTI is useful for studying the role of the cognitive triad in the etiology and
treatment o f depression. More specifically, the CTI is used to assess whether there is
changes in the cognitive triad relative to changes in depression. The paper and pencil
CTI questionnaire consists of 36 items with responses based on a seven-point Likert
scale. Participants are asked to fill out the questionnaire according to how they think
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“right now.” Sample items consist of statements such as “The world is a very hostile
place,” and “There is nothing to look forward to in the years ahead.” Beckham’s research
in 1986 concluded that initial internal reliability for the subscales was strong (.91 = self,
.81 = world, .93 = future). Beckham also concluded that the subscales (view o f self,
future) have shown strong convergent validity. Anderson and Skidmore (1995) examined
whether the CTI did in fact measure three distinct constructs in the cognitive triad. Based
on tests of undergraduates, Skidmore confirmed there is factorial validity for Beck’s
model that considers views of the self, world, and future to be correlated, yet distinct
constructs. On the other hand, McIntosh and Fischer (2000) concluded that the CTI only
reliably measured one construct - view of the self.
The Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS), developed by Weissman and Beck (1978),
is used to assess excessive and rigid beliefs that can predispose a person to depression.
These assumptions and beliefs are thought to reflect the content of relatively stable
cognitive schemas (Beck et al., 1991). The DAS consists of 100 items that are rated by
participants on a seven-point scale ranging from one (totally agree) to seven (totally
disagree). Participants are asked to rate statements that best describe “how they think.”
Sample items are “I can enjoy myself even when others do not like me,” and “What other
people think about me is very important.” The DAS consists of two parallel 40-item
forms (A and B). It takes approximately 5-10 minutes to complete one of the forms.
Dobson and Breiter (1983) state that, despite its reduced length, form A provides a
comprehensive assessment o f dysfunctional attitudes and has replicable factor structure.
The DAS has been found to display sufficient psychometric properties in both
psychiatric (Beck, Brown, & Steer, 1991) and college samples (Weissman, 1979). The
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DAS has shown good test-retest reliability (Zuroff, Blatt, & Sanislow, 1999), internal
consistency (Dobson & Breiter, 1983), and construct validity (Gotlib, 1984).
Additionally, the DAS has been successfully translated and shown good reliability and
validity in other cultures such as Norway (Chioqueta & Stiles, 2004), Cuba (Cairo,
Bernal, & Vea, 1998), Sweden (Ohrt & Thorell, 1998), and Germany (Hautzinger, Luka,
& Trautmann, 1985).
The Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ; Hollon & Kendall, 1980) was
designed to measure the frequency of occurrence of automatic negative thoughts
associated with depression. More specifically, it is a helpful aid in measuring the actual
cognitive ruminations o f depressed individuals. Cognitions endorsed by participants
evidence elevated levels of syndrome depression. The ATQ is a 40-item self
administered paper and pencil questionnaire with items scored from one (not at all) to
five (all the time). Sample items include “No one understands me” and “I’ll never make
it.” The ATQ asks the participant to make a judgment on the frequency that he or she has
a specific thought over the past week.
The ATQ has been shown to be a valid and reliable complement in conjunction with
other depression measures for a diagnosis of depression in clinical and nonclinical
samples (Harrell & Ryon, 1983; Cao, Chen, & Tang, 1999). It has shown high internal
consistency (Dobson & Breiter, 1983), concurrent validity (Clark, 1988; Dobson &
Breiter, 1983) and high sensitivity and specificity in discriminating depression from other
psychological disorders (Hill, Oei, & Hill, 1989; Cao, Chen, & Tang, 1999). In addition
it has been successfully translated into Norwegian (Chioqueta & Stiles, 2004), French
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(Charles 1989) and Turkish (Sahin & Sahin, 1992) forms that showed good reliability and
validity.

Methodological Issues in the Measurement of Thinking
As we have seen, Beck’s cognitive theory of depression suggests that errors or
distortions in thinking play a central role in the onset and maintenance of depression. We
have reviewed a number of questionnaires that have been developed to assess the
thinking constructs identified by Beck’s theory as playing an important role in
depression. However, there is substantial research that calls into question the extent to
which people can accurately characterize their thinking as requested on instruments such
as the BDI, CTI, DAS, and ATQ. In this section, I discuss this research and the general
methodological issues one should consider when trying to understand the nature of
people’s cognitive processes.
Since the beginning o f the science of psychology there has been substantial research
and interest in understanding people’s cognitive processes. Psychologists have attempted
a number of methods to capture people’s conscious mental activity, such as introspection
and, more recently, retrospective self-report questionnaires.
Introspective research involves asking people to report on their thoughts, feelings,
and sensations under natural or contrived circumstances. In the late 19*^ century,
researchers tried many different ways to obtain accurate reports of thinking, such as
cataloging mental elements (Titchener, 1909) and mental chronometry (Wundt,
1862/1961). Cataloging mental elements was an attempt at providing a psychological
analogy to the periodic table o f elements in chemistry. Mental chronometry is the
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measurement of the speed o f various psychological processes. However, introspection
failed to gain acceptance in the mainstream due to events such as the failure of leading
psychologists of that era to agree on imageless thoughts (Danzinger, 1980). Therefore
introspection was abandoned and the study o f mental life lay dormant for decades.
Behaviorism arose because it limited psychological study to overt behavior that could
be easily quantified and measured. Behaviorism dominated the field o f psychology for
much o f the early and mid 20'*' century until cognitive psychologists showed that learning
and conditioning could not account for all cognitions. For example, Chomsky (1959)
claimed that language could not be learned solely by operant conditioning because people
could generate words that had never been spoken before. Behaviorism eventually lost
favor to cognitive science. So once again the field o f psychology became interested in
finding ways to measure cognitions.
Cognitive science has developed a variety of ways to explore cognitive processes, but
these methods generally do not include introspective self-report. However, cognitive
theories developed or residing within the realm of clinical psychology, such as Beck’s
cognitive theory of depression, do employ self-reports to assess the nature of cognitive
processes.
The BDI, CTI, DAS, and ATQ, the primary tools used to measure the cognitive
processes in Beck’s cognitive theory of depression, are retrospective self-reports
questionnaires. They ask respondents to make judgments about their thoughts and
feelings. Essentially they are asking participants to make estimates about the extent that
they experience certain cognitions over a specific period of time, hold specified beliefs,
or experience specified feelings. Sample items from these questionnaires include “If I
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fail at my work, then I am a failure as a person,” “I am so sad or unhappy than I can’t
stand it,” and “I feel so helpless.” These statements are straightforward and similar to
thoughts and statements that would be explored by clinical psychologists. However,
accuracy issues arise when asking participants to make judgments about the nature and
frequency of their cognitions (Hurlburt, Heavey, & Seibert, 2006). These issues can be
divided into those related to memory and those concerning measurement procedures.
Memory issues arise during the encoding, storage, and retrieval stages. Potential
procedural measurement problems include demand characteristics, reactivity, and
ecological validity. I will address each of these issues in turn.
During the encoding stage, a problem that may occur is the target information may
not have been sufficiently encoded during this stage thus making it difficult to advance to
long-term memory. This in turn becomes problematic for later retrieval of the
information. This may be due to not paying attention to the event or possibly
experiencing competing cognitive information at the time of encoding. If information is
encoded, there are a numerous types of errors that people’s memories are susceptible to
in the encoding stage such as: perception, focus, expertise, and understanding (Haber &
Haber, 2000). For example, with regard to perception of an event, if a participant does
not have adequate visual acuity, he or she may not be able to report accurate details of the
event and reflections o f the event may be based on conclusions of what “must” have
happened. Parallel problems may occur with thé recall of inner experiences if the details
o f the experience were not sufficiently attended to be recalled clearly; specifically
individuals may then “fill in the blanks” using their beliefs or other available information.
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In terms o f focus during encoding, attention is allocated to activities of greatest
interest to the participant. In general, people can have fairly broad attention range.
However, some aspects of events cause involuntary narrowing of attention and as a result
other parts of the event are not attended to at all. Thus a person may not have sufficiently
encoded all the details of an event, but rather only what they focused on or attended to.
Furthermore, if a person has a certain amount of expertise related to an event, it may
affect his or her ability to encode information as well. Specifically, individuals lacking
experience with a person, object, or event, generally observe less detail, are less likely to
describe distinctive features, and are less likely to make a correct identification later
(Haber & Haber, 2000).
Another problem with encoding is the beliefs and expectations the participant uses to
organize and understand the event being observed. Bartlett (1932, cited in Haber &
Haber, 2000) read descriptions of logically ordered and unordered events to participants.
He found that participants could remember and repeat the logically ordered event with
some accuracy, but not the unordered event. This was construed as indicating that
individuals have difficulty encoding and remembering events that are inconsistent with
their expectations. Thus, there are a number of issues that can interfere with the encoding
o f an event.
In the storage stage of memory, difficulties may arise due to memory capacity and
decay. People do not have a limitless amount of information that can be received,
processed, and remembered (Miller, 1956). Miller found that regardless of elements (e.g.
digits, letters, words) people retained around seven plus or minus two elements of
information in their short-term memory. Since his study, other researchers have proposed
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retention levels of less than seven elements in short term memory (Cowan, 2001).
Factors affecting the ability to encode, store, and recall new information include rehearsal
(Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968), processing (Craik & Lockhart, 1972) and lexical status of
the contents (Hulme et al., 1995). In addition, storage is influenced by things such as the
primacy effect. The primacy effect involves information presented earlier in a series
being more likely to be recalled than information presented later because the time
available for rehearsal or processing of new material decreases as information continues
to be presented.
With regard to memory decay, studies involving memory have shown that people
experience rapid loss o f details following an event (Rubin & Wetzel, 1996). As time
increases relative to the occurrence of the event, the accuracy of the recalled details
becomes even worse (Bernard, Killworth, Kroenfeld, & Sailor, 1984). Tourangeau’s
(2000) attempt at providing a mathematical formula related to retention of information as
a function of time led to the conclusion that forgetting increases monotonically over time,
but it occurs rapidly at first then slows down. Additionally, Hurlburt (1984) concluded
that when people rate their experiences after a delay, they tend to intensify their
experiences by exaggerating their ratings of irritation, anger, vividness, and clarity. This
body of research suggests that people’s ability to accurately recall information after an
extended delay must be looked at with skepticism. To minimize error associated with
memory decay, researchers should attempt to obtain details of participant’s experiences
as soon after the event as possible.
The retrieval stage of memory is the process of getting information out of memory.
Retrieval is often enhanced by prompts that include associations, contexts, or mood.
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During the retrieval stage o f memory, errors that can occur with regard to answering
retrospective self-report questionnaires are types of memory accessed - semantic versus
episodic (Tulving, 1984, 1993) - and biasing effects of state-dependent memory and
mood-congruent memory.
Accuracy when answering a question depends on the type o f memory that is
prompted by the question or task. When retrieving an answer, people will access either
semantic or episodic memory (Robinson & Clore, 2002). Semantic memory is the
memory for knowledge or generalizations for events, free of time and place. For
example, if Benny asked how Matthew was feeling over the past month, Matthew would
likely access memory associated with his self-theory, an instance o f semantic memory.
Episodic memory is the memory of an event that has specific time, place, and experiential
details, such as emotions. For example, if Jessica asked Shannon how she is feeling after
their recent lecture. Shannon could presumably recall the specific moment and place as
well as the emotions associated with it.
The BDI and ATQ prompt participants to answer questions over a period of time
ranging from one to two weeks. Tulving (1984, 1993) explained that characterizations of
experience over time are more likely to rely on semantic memories. This is problematic
for recall because of potential distortions involved in semantic memory. Robinson and
Clore (2002) provided a review differentiating between emotion (episodic, contextual)
and beliefs about emotion (semantic, conceptual). In their review, contextual details of
events can aid in recall of emotions. However, as time lapses, recall of contextual details
declines which may cause random and systematic retrospective biases. Once details are
lost, the memory of an emotion shifts from episodic memory to semantic memory. As
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semantic memory takes over for an event, other retrospective biases may be come
involved, such as belief-consistent bias.
Beliefs about emotion can have direct effects on retrospective reports, leading to
incongruence between feelings at the time of experience versus estimations of those
feelings at a later date. For example, McFarland and Ross (1987) tracked romantic
relationships over a two-month period. Participants were asked about their perceptions of
their relationship at the beginning and at the end of the period. At the second report they
were asked to retrospect on their feelings two months earlier. Participant’s retrospective
reports were systematically biased in the direction of their current perceptions.
Robinson and Clore (2002) also stated that people’s ability to access their episodic
memory declines greatly after a week, so any question that prompts a response later than
a week will rely on semantic memory for the answer. The BDI asks a participant to report
about their feelings over the past two weeks, likely accessing their semantic memory.
Methods that invoke episodic memory are ideal in minimizing errors associated with
retrieval of memory. More specifically, methods that target recent, specific, clearly
identified moments will minimize biases associated with semantic memory, such as self
theory bias, confirmation bias, and pre-existing schemata (Hurlburt, Heavey & Seibert,
2006).
The effects of state-dependent memory can also influence the accuracy of responses
to questionnaires. Extensive research has shown that people’s memory for events can be
affected by the state that they are in at time o f testing. The physical surroundings (Eich,
1980), internal physiological state (Eich et al., 1975), and mood (Eich, 1995) of the
individual can influence what he or she may recall. In terms of physical surroundings.
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people who study in a certain area have shown better recall for details if they are tested in
the same area than if they were tested in a different area (Saufley et al., 1985). The
internal physiological state has also been shown to influence people’s memories. For
example, Eich et al. (1975) administered marijuana to participants in four different
conditions: encode under marijuana placebo-recall placebo, encode placebo-recall under
marijuana, encode under marijuana-recall under marijuana, and encode under marijuanarecall placebo. Overall, the placebo-placebo group scored the highest. However, results
showed that people who encoded material while under the influence o f marijuana recalled
more material when they were under the influence of marijuana during recall compared
to people under the influence during encoding but not under the influence during recall.
Another type of memory that influences recall is mood-congruent memory. Studies
have reported that people who are in a depressed state tend to recall prior negative
emotions (Denny & Hunt, 1992) and self-referential material (Beck, 1967; MacLeod &
Matthews, 1991) as being more frequent than what actually occurred. Thus a participant
who is feeling depressed while completing a self-report questionnaire will tend to endorse
more mood congruent items and may rate items relating to negative affect as more
frequent and more severe than actually experienced. In addition, by comparing the
results of clients completing a measure of symptomatic distress prior to enrolling in
therapy and after terminating therapy with those of a control sample. Safer and Kueler
(2002) found that participants who were enrolled in counseling overestimated their pre
therapy stress. Specifically, distress levels were lower than previously indicated, giving
the illusion o f more positive change over time. As discussed earlier, Lewinsohn and
Rosenbaum’s (1987) study of depressed participants’ recall of parental behavior showed
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that current level o f depression significantly affected characterizations of how loving and
rejecting parents were.
The effects of mood-congruent memory do not only occur with people who are
experiencing psychopathology. Research with so-called normal samples has shown that
depending on the person’s current affective state, a participant may bias his or her
perception o f past states (Natale & Hantas, 1982). The BDI and ATQ ask for participants
to characterize their experience over several weeks of time, thus participants may be
reporting inaccurately on items because of their current mood. Additionally, the DAS
and CTI may be prone to mood congruent memory bias because they prompt subjects to
respond to questions targeting their beliefs related to their self-concept. Specifically,
responses to items on these questionnaires would likely be different for participants when
they are feeling depressed compared to when they are in a happy mood.
Thus memory errors in the encoding, storage, and retrieval stages can influence the
accuracy o f participant’s responses. Errors arising from measurement procedures may be
important as well when trying to obtain accurate reports of experience.
Procedural measurement issues include demand characteristics, reactivity, and
ecological validity. Demand characteristics can distort research results. Demand
characteristics are cues that the researcher may give that may indicate to the participant
what the researcher wants to find. Participants may give in to the demands of the
experimenter rather than answer accurately. A researcher’s conduct, appearance, or type
of questioning may cause the participant to guess the rationale of the study and therefore
to work purposefully to confirm the experimenter’s hypothesis. The interviewer can
influence the way the participant responds by the type of questioning and nonverbal
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feedback as evidenced in eyewitness memory reports (Weinberg, Wadsworth, & Baron,
1983). Cassel et al. (1996) showed a theft of a bicycle on a video to participants in three
conditions: unbiased questioning; requesting specific information without suggesting an
answer; and questioning suggesting an answer. They reported that participants were
more influenced by questions that suggested an answer, concluding that the group was
influenced by the demand characteristics of the interviewer. Some of the possible
features that create demand characteristics are age, sex, ethnicity, accent, appearance,
social status, and personality traits.
Social desirability bias can be a problem for self-report questionnaires as well. Social
desirability is when the participant responds to a question in what he or she believes is a
socially acceptable manner (Fisher, 1993). When confronted with sensitive topics,
respondents may be unwilling to report answers accurately for ego-defense or impression
management reasons (Fisher, 1993). Prior studies have found that social desirability can
affect variable relationships (Zerbe & Paulhus, 1987); increase measurement error (Cote
& Buckley, 1988); and affect the means of variables (Peterson & Kerin, 1981). Thus
demand characteristics and social desirability are important to consider when conducting
research involving self-reports.
Another methodological issue that must be considered when using the BDI, CTI,
ATQ, and DAS is participants’ reactivity to those measures. Reactivity involves
participants being influenced by the measurement instrument such that they behave or
respond in a way that does not really represent the way they would naturally behave. A
classic example of reactivity would be people behaving differently because they realize
that they are being observed. Questionnaires can also produce reactivity. Knowles and
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Byers (1996) identified three sources of reactivity: within measure context effects,
meaning clarification, and self-referencing.
Within measure context effects suggest that subsequent responses are influenced by
responses on previous items. This raises the question whether participant’s responses are
due to the items serial position or the participant’s actual emotional state. Knowles
(1988) reported the participant’s responses are influenced by the item serial position and
not by differences due to specific items.
Tourangeau and Rasinski (1988) identified four stages that participants experience in
the inquiry-response o f self-report questionnaires: comprehension and meaning of
question; assembling relevant information (e.g., salient events, interactions, self
characterizations); judgment by integrating relevant information; and finally a response
that is tailored to the format of the question. They concluded in their study that the
earlier stages of this process have the potential for producing measurement reactivity.
Items can be open to various interpretations of meaning. Crutchfield and Gordon
(1947) concluded that often differences in respondents’ answers reflect differences in the
interpretation of the question more than differences in the state o f self. Participants can
also be influenced by implicit meanings of items that emerge spontaneously, without
effort (Uleman, 1987). Additionally, interpretations of items at the beginning of a test
can contribute to the meaning of later items (Bargh & Pratto, 1986).
Self-referencing can be reactive to having self-report questionnaires ask respondents
to relate the content of the question to their self-concept. This essentially creates greater
depth of processing o f information related to self-referential material. Once the selfconcept is activated it may prime other aspects of self-evaluation (Bargh & Pratto, 1986).
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This increased processing of self-evaluations may lead to more associations, elaborations,
and integration of the content of the inventory (Bumkrant & Unnava, 1989), essentially
leading to greater polarization and more consistency among later items. Thus, participant
reactivity is o f concern when answering items on the BDI, ATQ, CTI, and DAS.
Methods that may minimize participant reactivity should be as open-ended as possible,
while not invoking processes that go beyond the capture and report of the experience
(Hurlburt, Heavey & Seibert, 2006).
A problem that is difficult to overcome with self-report questionnaires is ecological
validity. In order for a study to possess ecological validity, the methods, materials, and
setting must approximate the real-life situation (Brewer, 2000). Self-report
questionnaires are usually not done within the context o f the participant’s environment.
According to Hurlburt (1997), the typical experiment is not ecologically valid because it
attempts to provide one condition that is identical all participants. To maximize
ecological validity, researchers should test participants in their environments while
disturbing them as little as possible. Self-report questionnaires do not generally test
people in their natural environment.
Methods that do not minimize the error associated with memory and procedural
measurement issues should be looked at with caution because of the concerns discussed
above, however they can be valid. The BDI, ATQ, CTI, and DAS are vulnerable to these
methodological concerns in their measurement of cognitions. Are there better methods
that minimize the memory errors as well as errors associated with procedural
measurement issues, such as demand characteristics, reactivity, and ecological validity?
There are several methods that have been developed in the last three decades that strive to
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address these methodological issues. Sampling methods may overcome some of these
problems that are associated with memory and procedural errors because these method
asks participants to respond within seconds of an event in their natural environment. So
rather than having a significant amount o f time elapse between an event and reporting
about it, participants will be beeped and then report their experience within seconds, thus
reducing errors associated with memory and other procedural concerns. In the next
section, I will discuss some of the methods that explore inner experience while
attempting to address the methodological concerns reviewed above.

Methods that Minimize Measurement Errors
As a result of the significant methodological errors associated with self-report
questionnaires, researchers have designed other strategies to gain insight into inner
experience. Some of these strategies include methods focused on accessing cognitions
(think aloud, articulated thoughts during simulated situations, and thought sampling),
whereas others have different or broader emphases (experience sampling method,
ecological momentary assessment, and descriptive experience sampling).
Think Aloud
The think aloud method is designed to help the researcher understand the content and
process o f a participants’ cognitions. Typically the procedure involves participants’
speaking about what they are thinking while participating in a task. Responses are
recorded and subsequently used to determine the content of the thoughts. The thoughts
are collected without probes or leading questions. This avoids prompting the participant
to provide explanations for their behavior (Meichenbaum & Cameron, 1981). The
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primary advantage of the method is that it avoids retrospective and memory biases
because the data is collected immediately as the cognitions are occurring.
Thus far the think aloud method has not been used specifically to evaluate Beck’s
theory of depression, though several studies with people who were experiencing
dysphoria (Conway, Howell, & Giannopoulos, 1991; Mayo & Matsumi, 1996) and
depression (Bamhofer, de Jong-Meyer & KleinpaB, 2002) have been conducted.
Conway, Howell, and Giannopoulos, (1991) examined dysphoric individuals’
suppression of unwanted thoughts. Participants consisted of 21 dysphoric and 21
nondysphoric people over two studies. In study I, participants were given either failure
or success feedback on a test. After the feedback, they were asked not to think about the
feedback while participating in a five-minute think aloud procedure. Dysphoric
participants had more thoughts of failure and fewer thoughts of success compared to
nondysphoric participants. In addition, during the final minute o f the procedure,
dysphoric subjects in both feedback conditions had more intrasions of failure than the
nondysphoric participants. In study 2, participants were asked not to think of the neutral
target “white bears.” Again, dysphoric participants had more intrusions of the target
“white bears” in the final minute then did the nondysphoric participants. Based on these
results the authors concluded that dysphoric participants demonstrated evidence for the
mood-congruence hypothesis and cognitive-effort hypothesis, which proposes that
dysphoric participants will be less successful at suppressing thoughts of any kind during
the later stages of a suppression period compared to nondysphoric participants because
they have reduced cognitive effort.
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Mayo and Matsumi (1996) examined self-statements of dysphoric and nondysphoric
participants while completing an interpersonal problem-solving task. Participants
consisted of 13 dysphoric and 15 nondysphoric people. They were shown a videotape o f
an interpersonal problem (relationship breakup) and asked to solve the problem while
speaking their thoughts. Participants’ answers were coded in five categories: task
facilitating, task inhibiting, emotion-focused, problem-focused, and periods of silence.
Results showed that dysphoric participants generated as many effective solutions as did
nondysphoric subjects. However, during problem solving, dysphoric participants gave
fewer problem focused statements and more emotion-focused statements. The
frequencies o f emotion-focused self-statements correlated negatively with the socially
coded score o f solution effectiveness.
Bamhofer, de Jong-Meyer, and KleinpaB (2002) investigated whether depressed
participants show consecutive retrievals of categoric memories. Categoric memories are
statements that are overgeneral by virtue o f referring to generic summaries of events.
During a think aloud procedure 15 depressed and 15 nondepressed participants were
asked to verbalize all thoughts. The procedure consisted of participants remembering
details o f an autobiographical event during which they were given two positive and two
negative cue words. The authors coded the number of different events and event
descriptions (categoric, extended, or specific). Depressed participants had more categoric
memories and fewer specific memories. The authors concluded that depressed
participants tend to produce sequences of consecutive categoric memories rather than
specific memories, indicating that this process may contribute to an overgeneralizing
retrieval style.
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Articulated Thoughts during Simulated Situations
Articulated Thoughts during Simulated Situations (ATSS; Davison, Robins, &
Johnson, 1983) is a paradigm that attempts to understand peoples’ cognitions through
highly structured, experimentally controlled situations. This paradigm allows openended verbal responding rather than retrospective reports. Experimenters are able to
specify and manipulate situations as well as produce different states of emotions. It is
very cost and time effective. In a typical study, participants are presented with an audio
recording of a conversation simulating a complex event. Participants are asked to pretend
that the event is actually happening and that they are part of the situation. Participants
are told to verbalize out loud their thoughts that they are having as the situation occurs.
The audiotape plays for about 15-25 seconds and then the participant responds for about
30 seconds. This sequence is then repeated multiple times and responses are recorded for
further analysis.
To date, few studies have used ATSS with depressed individuals. White, Davison,
and Haaga (1992) explored cognitive bias in the articulated thoughts of depressed and
nondepressed psychiatric outpatients. They put participants in negative (rained on the
day o f a barbeque), neutral, and positive audio taped simulated situations. Depressed
participants exceeded nondepressed participants in cognitive bias in the negative
simulated situation. This finding provided support for the method as well as an aspect of
Beck’s cognitive theory of depression.
Thought Sampling
Thought Sampling is another form of research that attempts to gain insight into
participants’ daily experiences. The goal is to quantify characteristics or aspects of
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thinking (Hurlburt, 1997). Typically, participants are given a beeper and are requested to
rate their thought contents on a series of Likert scales. Participants are beeped at random
intervals. As a result of the unpredictability of when a beep will occur during a
participant’s day and immediacy of reports, thought sampling overcomes some of the
problems with retrospective recall and improves ecological validity.
To date, thought sampling has not been used often with participants who are
experiencing depression. Josephson, Rose, and Singer (1999) used thought sampling
with depressed and nondepressed participants and correlated it with the Beck Depression
Inventory. Participants were beeped randomly for a fifteen-minute period and asked to
speak their thoughts aloud. The results showed that participant’s mood correlated with
thought content. In addition, thought content correlated with the Beck Depression
Inventory. Depressed participants were found to have more overall negative thought
content than nondepressed participants.
Ecological Momentary Assessment
Ecological Momentary Assessment (EMA) uses a sampling strategy of obtaining
multiple momentary assessments to describe a person or process (Shif&nan & Stone,
1998). Sampling strategies can include event-contingent, interval-contingent (fixed
times), and signal-contingent (response to audible signal) prompting. To gather data,
EMA uses handheld computers (also called PDAs). Handheld computers help the
researchers detect if a participant decided to fake the time of a diary entry. Additionally,
the handheld computers can minimize participant’s errors involving skipping questions or
providing answers that are ambiguous. Furthermore computerized entries reduce the
sense o f intrasiveness that may be experienced in interviews (Bendtsen & Timpka, 1999).
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To date, only one study has explored depressed participants with the EMA method.
Biller (2005) attempted to identify the response pattern of individuals with depression
while undergoing psychotherapy. Participants included 41 depressed participants and 30
controls. The depressed participants were divided into two groups consisting of 12 and
29 participants. The group with 12 participants engaged in EMA, which included the
handheld computer. However, only 3 participants out of thé 12 completed the study.
Reasons for the high dropout rate consisted of termination of psychotherapy, not
completing the study requirements, therapist request, and software problems. The
remaining 3 participants were prompted twice a day for a six-week period to record their
cognitions and mood. Participants were expected to rate 30 statements on a Likert scale.
In addition, participants filled out the BDI-II three times over the six-week period. The
other group o f 29 depressed participants and 30 normal participants were only required to
fill out the BDI-II and a paper and pencil questionnaire that consisted of the same items
as the handheld computer one time. No common pattems emerged within the three
depressed participants’ responses to positive and negative affect nor did they find a
reduction in negative affect in response to the amount of therapy participation. They
concluded that using EMA could help in individualizing treatments and help in
identifying factors that may influence therapeutic progress, though compliance may be
difficult to obtain.
Experience Sampling Method
Experience Sampling Method (ESM; Csikszentmihalyi, 1983) is a quantitative
approach to introspection. The method requires participants to fill out self-assessments in
their natural settings. These self-assessments address things such as cognitions.
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emotions, symptoms, motivation, and activities. In addition, participants usually describe
their physical and social context. To reduce retrospective error, participants are required
to respond to questions after they have been beeped. The beeper is designed to go off
during semi-random intervals of approximately 90 minutes. Often a participant is
required to respond to 10 beeps for six consecutive days. Once completed, statistical
analyses are performed to help interpret the results.
Although there have been quite a few studies that have utilized ESM to examine
participants who are experiencing depression (Kraan et al., 1992; Merrick, 1992; Mokros,
1993; Barge-Schaapveld, Nicolson, & Berkof, 1999; Myin-Germeys et al., 2003; Peeters,
Nicholson & Berkhof, 2003; Peeters, Nicholson, Berkhof, & Delespaul, 2003), there have
been only a few studies that have specifically examined a theory of depression
(Hopelessness-Helplessness; Swendsen, 1997, 1998, 2000) and only one study that has
explored Beck’s cognitive theory of depression (Swendsen, in press).
Kraan et al. (1992) explored the use of ESM as a supplement to conventional
assessment methods such as the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual. Participants consisted
of 16 newly admitted depressed patients, six individuals with depression in remission,
and four normal controls. For six consecutive days, 10 times per day participants were
triggered by a pager and requested to fill out a series of Likert-scale items and openended questions. Items were chosen by a panel of clinical and research experts. Items
concerning major depression were selected from the DSM-III-R and Research Diagnostic
Criteria. In addition survey items also included questions from the Zung Depression
Scale, BDI, Hamilton Depression Rating Scale, Plutchik-van Praag’s Depression
Inventory, and Carrol Scale. Depressed participants were found to have more variability
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in negative mood compared to controls. Recent onset and remitted depressed participants
were unable to be differentiated with regard to negative mood factors. However, the
ESM procedure allowed the author of this study to differentiate these groups with regards
to positive mood factors.
Merrick (1992) attempted to explore the topography of everyday experience including
everyday moods and situations o f depressed participants. Eighteen participants
participated in the study and were divided into three groups: currently depressed (CD),
previously depressed (PD), and normal controls. Participants completed the ESM
procedure consisting o f eight beeps per day. Participants completed questions that were
specific to depressive symptoms such as the experience of negativity, causal attributions
of events, and dysphonie mood (sad, lonely, grouchy, angry, bored, and pleasure).
Severity o f dysphoria was analyzed on three different axes: frequency, intensity, and
duration. Sadness, loneliness, boredom, and anhedonia were experienced more
frequently in the depressed samples compared to the normal controls. With regards to
intensity o f depressive symptoms, CD reported the most dysphoric, while PD reported the
least dysphoric. CD were reported to spend more time at home and less time in public
places compared to the other groups. CD spent most o f their time in the living room. In
addition, the CD group spent less time engaging in productive activities such as
schoolwork or job. CD spent significantly more time alone. O f note was that in the 239
beeps that were collected, there was not one beep where a CD participant was in the
company of only one member of the opposite sex. Of the time spent with friends, CD’s
spent only 4% o f their time with more than one member of the opposite sex.
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Mokros (1993) examined the relation between single-time-point clinician-based
judgments and multiple-time-point self-reports for three essential symptoms of
depression (sadness, irritability, and anhedonia). He hypothesized that the role of
communication in the diagnosis of mental disorders cannot be confined to the study of
interpersonal interactions alone. Participants consisted of seven depressed adolescents
and 14 healthy adolescents. Participants were signaled eight times on seven consecutive
days to complete the Random Activities Survey (RAIS). More specifically, they noted
time of day, physical location, who they were with, what they were doing, and rated
items on the RAIS via a series of 7-point Likert scales. A clinician interviewed the
participant prior to engaging in the study and immediately following completion. During
the clinical interview, depressed participants reported prominent and persistent sadness;
however during ESM, sadness was not reported to be any different than that o f healthy
participants. In addition four out o f the seven depressed participants reported irritability
at a rate less than what was expected via the clinical evaluation. Two participants judged
to be pervasively anhedonic by clinical evaluation failed to show evidence of anhedonia
during their ESM ratings.
Barge-Schaapveld, Nicolson, and Berkof (1999) examined the contribution of mood
states, physical complaints and enjoyment of activities to a momentary measure of
quality of life (mQoL). The authors hypothesized that mQoL would fluctuate more
widely in depressed participants than in healthy control participants. Participants
consisted of 63 depressed and 22 healthy participants. Participants completed a selfreport after each beep, 10 times for six consecutive days. At each beep, participants rated
their mQoL (“In general, how is it going with you right now?”), current mood, physical
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complaints and enjoyment of activity on 7-point Likert scales. In addition, participants
completed retrospective measures o f global quality of life, mood, physical complaints,
enjoyment o f daily activities and depressive symptoms. Depressed participants had lower
levels of mQoL, positive mood, and enjoyment of activity, higher negative mood, and
more frequent and severe complaints. Depressed participants were more likely to be
doing nothing and less likely to be engaged in work compared to controls. In addition,
depressed participants had more variability in mQoL over time than controls. The authors
concluded that mQoL can help explain the impact o f depression on daily functioning and
well-being.
Myin-Genney et al. (2003) investigated emotional reactivity to minor stressors in the
daily lives o f people who are experiencing depression. The intent of the study was to
determine if there is in fact an increase in emotional reactivity between people who are
experiencing psychosis and people who are not. The study consisted of 42 people with
non-affective psychosis, 49 healthy controls, 38 with bipolar, and 46 with major
depressive disorder. Participants were given a watch that would beep 10 times for 6
consecutive days. When beeped, participants completed a self-assessment form
concerning thoughts, current context, appraisals of the current situation, and mood.
Participants rated mood and stress items on 7-point Likert scales. Participants who were
in a current depressed episode had significantly higher negative affect and lower positive
affect than did all other groups. Furthermore, type of mood indicated a difference in
emotional reactivity. Bipolar participants had decreases in positive affect in response to
stress while depressed participants had significantly larger increase in negative affect in
responses to stress when compared to controls.
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Peeters, Nicholson, Berkhof, and Delespaul (2003) explored the effects of daily
events on mood states in participants who were experiencing depression. They
hypothesized that severity of depressed episodes would influence mood reactivity to daily
events. Additionally, they hypothesized that duration of current episode o f depression
and a history of previous episodes of major depression would increase reactivity in
negative affect and positive affect with regards to negative events as well as decrease
reactivity o f both mood states to positive events. They compared 47 depressed
participants to 39 healthy participants. Depressed participants were included in the study
based on a prior DSM-IV diagnosis. Symptom Checklist-90 scores, and high scores on
the BDI. Participants were requested to fill out self-reports o f mood and events 10 times
each day for six consecutive days. Mood assessment was assessed by 16 adjectives (e.g.
irritated, guilty, happy) on a series of 7-point Likert scales. In addition, participants were
asked to describe at the moment of the beep any positive and/or negative event that may
have taken place since the last beep and to rate the event(s) on the same Likert scales.
Positive events were rated on the dimensions of pleasant, important, and stressful, while
negative events were rated on the dimensions of unpleasant, important, and stressful.
Participants who were depressed did not report more frequent negative events but did
report fewer positive events compared to healthy participants. Negative affect in
response to negative events lasted longer in depressed participants.
Recent biological research with participants who are experiencing depression has
focused on abnormal cortisol levels. It is thought that abnormal levels of the
hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis related to stress has a part in the pathophysiology of
major depression. Peeters, Nicholson, and Berkhof (2003) attempted to determine if
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levels o f cortisol among 47 depressed participants compared to 39 healthy participants
were related to negative and positive daily events. In addition, the authors examined the
influence o f clinical characteristics and gender differences in cortisol responses to events,
as well as mood changes. Participants were requested to fill out self-report
questionnaires o f mood and events and simultaneously provide saliva samples 10 times
each day for six consecutive days. When faced with a negative event, healthy
participants had increases in cortisol levels, while depressed participants showed no
increase. Depressed participants who have a history of mood disorders showed even less
increases in cortisol levels when facing a negative event. Women who were depressed
tended to show larger cortisol responses to negative events than men who were
experiencing depression. Furthermore, negative affect tended to be less closely
associated with cortisol levels in depressed participants.
ESM has also been used to explore the Hopelessness-Helplessness theory of
depression. This theory postulates that once a negative event has occurred, the individual
determines if the event is within their control. In addition the individual determines the
degree to which the cause o f the event is internal, stable, and global. The theory views
anxiety and depression as both being characterized by helplessness, but that only
depression is characterized by hopelessness. Hopelessness cannot occur without
helplessness, therefore anxiety symptoms are common within depression syndromes.
Anxiety is the initial mood reaction to a negative event and in turn can make the
individual experience hopelessness if they view the event as stable and global. It is also
stated that individuals with depressogenic attributional styles should be more likely to
attribute negative events to stable and global causes; therefore be more likely to
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experience hopelessness depression. Swendsen (1997) categorized 44 participants into
two groups consisting of attributional styles at low or high risk for depression.
Participants were signaled five times a day for a one-week period. At each signal they
completed an experience sampling form that contained measures of daily life events,
attributions, and state anxious and depressed moods. Results for the most part supported
the theory. Individual attributional (e.g., depressogenic) style predicted the momentary
causal attributions. Support for the Hopelessness-Helplessness theory also came from the
finding that hopeless causal attributions for minor negative events predicted changes in
residual depressed mood. Following negative events, causal attributions o f globality and
stability explained increases in depressed mood. These results differentiated between
anxiety and depression, consistent with the theory’s assertion that negative outcome
expectancy is unique to depression. Swendsen was unable to find support for the
assertion that helplessness expectancy should consistently predict anxiety.
Swendsen (1998) used the ESM to examine idiographic and cross-situational data in
hopes o f validating components of the helplessness-hopelessness theory. Ninety-one
participants participated in the study. They were required to fill out a questionnaire five
times a day for seven days. He assessed their attributional and perception of control
styles via questionnaires. At each beep participants filled out a self-report form
concerning their experiences of anxious and depressed moods, daily life events, and
specific attributions made to these events. Swendsen was unable to find a link between
attributional and perception of control styles with regard to negative events predicting
immediate depression. However, attributional and perception of control styles was
predictive of causal attributions and perceptions of control across the daily flow of
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environmental contexts. Furthermore, specific causal attributions of negative events
explained fluctuations in depressed mood over and above individual’s daily experience.
Results also supported a highly specific timeframe for testing theories of depression.
More specifically, stable and global causal attributions had their greatest influence
immediately after the negative event and subsequently influenced mood for typically up
to six hours afterward.
Swendsen (2000) examined the cross-cultural validity of the HelplessnessHopelessness theory using ESM with participants from France (90) and the United states
(43). Participants were signaled five times a day for one week. The participants were
asked to report negative events (Inventory of Small Life Events), attributions, and
depressed moods (BDI). Participants would then evaluate the event that had the biggest
impact on them as well as its degree of negativity. This would involve providing answers
on 7-point Likert scales regarding the event’s stability, globality, and intemality.
Swendsen reported that there were differences between cultures concerning the average
severity of daily negative events, depressed moods, and causal attributions. More
specifically, French participants tended to be more negative about their daily negative
events, but attributed fewer causal attributions to themselves compared to the Americans.
Level of depression did not vary across the cultures.
Swendsen (in press) used ESM to compare the hopelessness theory and Beck’s theory
with regard to depressed mood in daily life. He hypothesized that depressed attributional
styles would predict more negative causal attributions to negative events throughout the
day and, as a result these specific attributions, would be associated with increases in
depressed mood. In addition, he hypothesized that sociotropic individuals (high levels of
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dependence and excessive need to please others) would experience more depressed mood
following a negative interpersonal event, whereas autonomic individuals (self-governing,
independent) would experience more depressed mood following a negative achievement
related event. Based on cognitive vulnerabilities and substance use frequency, 179
participants were selected for the study. Participants filled out self-report questionnaires
regarding mood, attributional style, and daily events when beeped. Swendsen reported
that attributional style and sociotropy were indirect determinants of depressed mood. In
addition, attributional style and sociotropy supported causal mediation and specificity.
More specifically, although the sample as a whole experienced an increase in depressed
mood following a negative event, the association was much stronger with sociotropic
individuals. Sociotropy did not have a direct effect on depressed mood in general, but did
affect the person’s mood following a negative social event. Autonomy was not found to
have an effect on depressed mood. Additionally, atrtibutional style was found to predict
the differing levels of specific attributions to the variety of negative events experienced in
daily life. The momentary cognitions were in turn able to explain the variance in
depressed mood. The hopelessness theory was able to explain a larger portion of
variance in depressed mood overall than Beck’s theory.
Descriptive Experience Sampling
Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES; Hurlburt, 1990, 1993) is a method for
developing high fidelity descriptions of inner experience. It involves asking participants
to wear a random beeper in their natural environment. Participants are instructed to pay
attention to whatever is in their awareness at the moment immediately prior to the beep.
Participants are then asked to jot down notes about the characteristics of their experience
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at that moment in a notebook. After collecting a certain number of moments (usually five
or six beeps) the investigator conducts an intensive expositional interview. This
interview is conducted within 24 hours of when the beeps are collected. The participant
is asked to describe the experience at the moment o f each beep and to collaborate with
the interviewer to understand the details of the experience. The interviewer strives to
gain an accurate apprehension of the experience while limiting presuppositions. In
addition, the interviewer works collaboratively with the participant to develop
descriptions of the experience that are as true to the original experience as possible.
Participants have the freedom to withhold experiences that they consider to be too private
to talk about. They are encouraged to think of themselves as co-researchers in the
investigation. Once the experience has been sufficiently explored, the interviewer
summarizes the moment to the participant and inquires if there is anything else that was
missed or if the summary of the experience was not exactly precise. Sampling with each
participant usually occurs over four to eight sessions and the first day is usually
considered training for the participant and descriptions from it are generally not used.
After collecting a sufficient number o f moments of experience, the DES investigator will
attempt to identify salient characteristics of the individual.
DES, therefore, is an idiographic procedure that attempts to characterize one
individual’s experience. In addition, DES can also be used to examine the inner
experience of participants who have similar characteristics (e.g., psychiatric diagnosis).
When used in this manner, a number of individuals with a shared characteristic are
sampled. Idiographic profiles of each individual are developed. These idiographic
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profiles are then examined to determine if there are shared characteristics across
individuals. This can allow for nomothetic characterizations o f common experiences.
The primary difference between DES and other sampling methods is that DES is only
focused on the participant’s inner experience as it naturally occurs to them. ESM picks
aspects o f awareness and other aspects of experience, such as social or environmental
context and activity as the focus o f investigation a priori. In addition, ESM ask subjects
to report on these dimensions using a structured format. Sometimes ESM does not
investigate the participant’s actual thinking, but rather measure their mood, quality of
life, and physical concerns. Furthermore ESM may use a Likert rating scale to measure
the items of interest. DES does not ask the participant to pay attention to their
environment or physical attributes unless that is what the participant reports that they are
experiencing at the moment of a beep. Additionally, DES provides qualitative
descriptions rather than quantitative analysis (Hurlburt, 1997).
There have been only a handful of studies with participants who are experiencing
depression using the method of DES. Hurlburt (1993) explored the inner experience of
individuals with affective disorders. Three of the participants had varying levels of
depression and one participant experienced hypomanie periods. Five characteristics stood
out: unsymbolized thinking and affect, relation of inner perceptual clarity and affect,
inability of depressed individuals to distinguish perceptual Ifom conceptual descriptions
of inner experience, inconstancy of the perceiver in depression, and the prevalence of
emotional processes outside of awareness. Each of these characteristics will now be
described in more detail.
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The first characteristic noted was that the frequency of inner symbolization decreases
as depression increases. Thus the frequency of words and images decreased while the
frequency o f unsymbolized thinking increased as depression increased. For example,
participant Michelle experienced symbols (inner speech or images) most of the time
during nondepressed periods, however when experiencing dysphoria she had increases of
inner experience consisting of partially unworded experiences and unsymbolized
thinking.
The second observation was that inner perceptual clarity decreased as depression
increased. For example, participants when not depressed were able to report more details
of events, especially when they were experiencing a visual image. However, when
depressed, all the participants described intemal visual experiences without much clarity.
This suggests that depressed participants were experiencing cloudiness or that the inner
perception process becomes unclear.
The third characteristic observed was that depressed participants had difficulty in
discriminating perceptual description from conceptual description. More specifically the
three depressed participants reported seeing an inner image, but when probed carefully
the experience was revealed not to be an image at all. For example, depressed participant
Susan described a picture of her therapist on her wall, but after being queried about the
details of the picture, she was unable to describe them. This may indicate at the moment
she had difficulty in telling the difference between a cognition and perception.
The fourth characteristic observed was the inconstancy of the perceiver, as the
participant reported having distinctly different mental states associated with different
thoughts. For example, participant Diane usually experienced inner speech in her head.
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but when depressed she occasionally experienced inner speech in other parts o f her body
such as her stomach. Hurlburt concluded that individuals, when depressed, might not
have a clear, stable platform from which to view their own experiences.
The fifth observation was that participants experienced emotional processing outside
of awareness. For example, participants reported the frequent existence of emotional
processing in their physical bodies, but didn’t recognize these emotions in their
awareness at the moment of the beep. For example, participants who were feeling sad or
agitated throughout their body often were not aware of those feelings.
O f note with the three depressed participants were that all the participants were able
to recognize that their affect was changing, but unable to recognize that their cognitions
were also changing with changes in their affect.
Perlotto (2001) explored the inner experience of participants who were experiencing
depression. Eight participants participated in the study with three participants who were
labeled depressed and five participants who were controls. Each participant completed
six beeps per session for approximately five sessions. The most salient characteristics of
the depressed group were feelings, sensory awareness, and unsymbolized thinking.
However, the results did not differ much from the control group whose samples contained
mostly feelings, sensory awareness, and images. O f note, the depressed group tended to
have more multiple experiences per beep compared to the control group and a higher
percentage of feelings per sample. The depressed group also had a much greater rate of
negative than positive feelings (4:1 ratio) compared to the control group (1:1 ratio).
Cavenagh (2003) explored attributional styles in participants via DES. The study
consisted o f three participants who had a very high negative attributional style and three
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who had a non-negative attributional style. Each participant was beeped six times a day
for four days. Each beep was coded for evidence of the cognitive triad, attributional
style, negative valence, and rumination by the authors. The operational definition for the
cognitive triad was an overly pessimistic view of oneself, one’s world, and one’s future.
The operational definition for negative valence was a thought or emotion that has a
negative tone. Out of the six participants, two were determined to be at high risk for
depression (one fi-om each group). The depressed participants’ high scores on the
cognitive triad compared to the low scores among the other four participants provided
support for the cognitive triad. In addition, the two high risk-depressed participants
evidenced the highest fi-equency o f negative valence (a thought that has a negative tone).
Additionally, the two depressed participants had more experiences o f sensory awareness
and infrequent images compared to the other four participants.
Although each o f the methods reviewed in this section is able to address some of the
methodological concems relevant to understanding inner experience, DES addresses
these concems most comprehensively. Memory decay and the potentially biasing
influence of state-dependent memory are reduced by the short interval between event and
recording o f the event. DES targets episodic memory because it targets specific, clearly
identified moments, thus reducing the errors associated with semantic memory. Errors
associated with memory capacity are reduced because DES is interested in only brief
moments (one second or less) of experience. Participant reactivity is minimized because
the method does not try to invoke processes that go beyond the capture and report of the
experience, as well as allowing the participant to report the experience without
restrictions. Ecological validity is maximized in the DES procedure because participants
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are sampled in their natural environment. Demand characteristics are minimized by the
researchers attempt to not ask leading questions. DES interviewers also are trained to ask
questions that do not involve presuppositions. Thus DES is a procedure that can
effectively minimize errors associated with retrospective self-reports. This study will
employ DES to investigate the central components of Beck’s cognitive theory of
depression. This will allow the examination of the extent to which findings fi'om DES
converge with those obtained from commonly used questionnaires.
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CHAPTER 3

METHOD
This study consisted of three phases: a screening phase to identify possibly suitable
candidates, a qualification phase to determine if candidates were suitable for the study,
and a sampling phase in which I explored the inner experience of individuals who are and
who are not suffering from depression.

Screening Phase
Overview
The Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977), a
demographic questionnaire, and an informed consent form were administered to
undergraduate students taking an introductory psychology course during the Spring, 2007
semester at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Based on the results of the CES-D,
students identified as either moderate or severely depressed, or not depressed were
invited to enter the qualification phase.
Participants
The participants in this phase were made up of 133 Spring, 2007 University of
Nevada, Las Vegas undergraduate General Psychology students. Students who agreed to
participate in the screening phase were given one half hour of psychology research
participation credit. Participants included 73 males and 60 females. The average age o f
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the participants was 20.18 years. Sixty-seven percent of the participants were employed
and 98% were single. The ethnicities o f the participants were 8% African Americans,
17% Asians, 55% Caucasians, 19% Hispanics, and 1% Middle-Eastemers.
Instrument
The demographic questionnaire consisted of name, address, phone number, cell
phone number, age, race, sex, marital status, education level, medication, counseling
status, and employment status.
The CES-D (Radloff, 1977) is a 20-item self-report questionnaire. It is designed to
screen for symptoms of depression as well as to measure change in symptom severity
over time. Participants rated how much each statement describes how they felt during the
past week on a Likert scale ranging from zero to three. The total score ranges from 0 to
60. The cutoff for differentiating depressed from nondepressed participants is 16. The
total completion time for the test is generally under 10 minutes. Radloff (1977) has
provided norms and psychometric properties for the CES-D as follows. With regard to
intemal consistency, coefficient alpha ranged from .85 to .90. The stability of the
measure over a range o f two to eight weeks was found to be between .51 and .67. The
measure has correlated highly with other depression scales such as the Beck Depression
Inventory and the Zung Depression Scale, indicating good convergent validity.
Procedure
At the beginning or end o f a class period, the researcher briefly described the study,
obtained informed consent, and asked students to complete the demographic
questionnaire and the CES-D in exchange for psychology research credit. Participants
scoring at or above 16 on the CES-D were subsequently contacted for participation in the
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qualification phase. In addition, students in the lowest quartile of CES-D scores were
contacted to participate in the next phase.

Qualification Phase
Overview
The students involved in the qualification phase participated in a more detailed,
thorough assessment o f depression involving the use of a semi-structured clinical
interview. Those found to meet diagnostic criteria for major depression disorder or no
significant depression was invited to participate in the sampling phase of the study.
Participants
Undergraduate students with the highest and lowest scores on the CES-D were invited
to participate in the qualification phase. Participant recruitment in this phase was not
random. Participants were contacted until six participants had qualified and agreed to
participate in the sampling phase. Approximately twenty people were invited to
participate in the depressed sample. Two people declined to participate over the phone,
while the others did not return a phone message left by the researcher. Participants were
given one hour of course research credit for their participation in the qualification phase.
Of the eight participants that were interviewed for the depressed group, six qualified for
the study. The average score on the CES-D for the depressed group was 30.75.
Approximately eight people were contacted to participate in the control sample. Three of
those participants contacted did not return a phone message left by the researcher. Of the
five participants who were interviewed for the control group, four qualified for the study.
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The average score on the CES-D for the control group was 3.20. Participants consisted o f
nine men and four women. The average age o f the participants was 24.31 years.
Instrument
The mood disorders modules of the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis 1
Disorders (SCID; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams 2002) is a semi-structured
diagnostic interview designed to assist clinicians, researchers, and trainees in making
reliable DSM-IV psychiatric diagnoses. A person who meets criteria for a psychiatric
diagnosis can take between one to two hours to complete the full-length interview of the
SCID, while a person who does not meet criteria for any diagnoses can complete the
interview within 30 to 90 minutes. However, only the mood disorders module of the
SCID was administered, so participants were able to complete the interview within thirty
minutes to one hour. The SCID has been shown to be a reliable and valid measure for a
diagnosis o f Major Depressive Disorder (Zanarini, et al., 2000, Zanarini, et al., 2001).
More specifically, Zanarini et al. (2000) found correlation coefficients for test-retest
reliability for a 7 to 10 day period was .61 and interrater reliability was found to be .80.
Procedure
The SCID was administered to each of the students who met the screening criteria,
agreed to participate, and executed an informed consent form. Those who met diagnostic
criteria for major depressive disorder and those who showed no symptoms of major
depression were invited to participate in the sampling phase.

56

Sampling Phase

Overview
Six participants confirmed in the qualification phase as having met diagnostic criteria
for major depression disorder were invited to participate in Descriptive Experience
Sampling (DES) along with four nondepressed control participants. Each participant was
provided with the appropriate beeper apparatus and instructions on how to record their
inner experience.
Participants
Six undergraduate students who met diagnostic criteria for major depression disorder
according to the SCID participated in the sampling phase. In addition, four
undergraduate students from the initial screening and qualification populations who did
not show symptoms of depression participated as the control group for the sampling
phase. The depressed group consisted of four men and two women. The control group
was made up of three males and one female. The average age was 25 years for the
depressed group and 18.25 years for the control group. The participants consisted of
seven employed students. The ethnicities of the participants were two Asians, six
Caucasians, and two Hispanics. The sample consisted of six freshman, two sophomores,
one senior, and one seeking a second degree.
Instruments
The Beck Depression Inventory - Second Edition (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown,
1996) is paper and pencil test designed to assess affective, behavioral, cognitive, and
motivational aspects o f depression. It is intended for use with adults and adolescents 13
years of age and older. The BDI-II is not intended for diagnosis, but rather to aid in
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identifying the presence and severity of symptoms consistent with the DSM. The BDI-II
consists o f 21 items and responses based on a 4-point Likert scales ranging from zero
(e.g., I do not feel sad) to three (e.g., I am so sad or unhappy that I cannot stand it). Total
scores o f 0-13 are considered to reflect minimal depression, 14-19 reflects mild
depression, 20-28 reflects moderate depression, and 29-63 reflects severe depression.
The BDI-II is the most widely used measure for depression and has very good
psychometric properties including test-retest reliability (r = .93; Beck, Steer, & Brown,
1996) and intemal consistency (alpha = .91; Dozois, Ahnberg, & Dobson, 1998).
The Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale Form A (DAS; Weissman & Beck, 1978) consists
of 40 items that are rated by participants on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 {totally agree)
to 7 {totally disagree). Sample items include “I can enjoy myself even when others do
not like me,” and “What other people think about me is very important.” It is used to
assess excessive and rigid beliefs that can predispose a person to depression. The DAS
displays sufficient psychometric properties in both psychiatric (Beck, Brown, & Steer,
1991) and college samples (Weissman, 1979). The DAS has shown good test-retest
reliability (Zuroff, Blatt, & Sanislow, 1999), intemal consistency (Dobson & Breiter,
1983), and construct validity (Gotlib, 1984). The DAS has been shown to have a high
interrelationship with the BDI (Ilardi, 1995).
The Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ; Hollon & Kendall, 1980) is a 40-item
self-administered paper and pen questionnaire designed to measure the frequency of
occurrence of automatic negative thoughts associated with depression. Research has
shown the ATQ to be valid and reliable in conjunction with other depression measures
for a diagnosis of depression in clinical and nonclinical samples (Harrell & Ryon, 1983;
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Cao, Chen, & Tang, 1999). It has shown high intemal consistency (Dobson & Breiter,
1983), concurrent validity (Clark, 1988; Dobson & Breiter, 1983) and high sensitivity
and specificity in discriminating depression from other psychological disorders (Hill, Oei,
& Hill, 1989; Cao, Chen, & Tang, 1999). The ATQ has been shown to have a high
correlation with the BDI (Harrell & Ryon, 1983and a moderate correlation with the DAS
(Dobson & Breiter, 1983).
The Cognitive Triad Inventory (CTI; Beckham, 1986) was designed to measure the
three specific constructs (view of self, world, and future) associated with Beck’s
Cognitive Triad. The CTI is specifically used to assess whether there are changes in the
cognitive triad relative to changes in depression. The CTI questionnaire consists of 36
items with responses based on a 7-point Likert scales. Beckham’s research concluded
that initial intemal consistency for the subscales was strong and that the scale has strong
convergent validity. The CTI has been shown to have a high correlation with the BDI
(Maldonado, Luque, & Herrera, 1999).
Apparatus
Participants were given a portable beeper with an earphone. The beeper is
programmed to give a 700-Hz tone at random intervals ranging from immediate to one
hour with a mean length of thirty minutes. In addition, participants were given a pocketsized notebook in which to record notes about their inner experience at beeped moments.
Procedure
Participants were contacted via email or phone to take part in the sampling phase.
Participants were asked to come to an initial meeting at the experience-sampling lab.
During this meeting the investigator explained the study including possible benefits of
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participating, the procedure, and the required time commitment. If the participant was
interested in taking part in this phase, they were told about the limits of confidentiality
and that they can discontinue the study at any time. Furthermore, participants were asked
to provide informed consent.
Once the informed consent had been completed, participants were given instruction
on the DES procedure. They were informed how to operate the beeper and wear the
earphone. More specifically, they were shown how to turn the beeper on and off, adjust
the volume, and reset the beeper by pressing a button. In addition, participants were
given a pocket-sized notebook and instructed to jot down notes on their inner experience
after each beep. Participants were asked to collect six beeps during their normal daily
activities within twenty-four hours of the scheduled expositional interview. They were
instructed to write down in their notebook what was in their inner experience right before
the beep went off. In addition, participants were allowed to decline discussion o f any
beeps that they did not feel comfortable sharing. Once the instructions had been
completed and questions about the procedure had been answered, participants were asked
to fill out the BDI-II, CTI, DAS, and ATQ. After the participant had finished
completing the questionnaires, the investigator set up the first meeting for an expositional
interview.
Within 24 hours after the participant had collected six beeps the investigator
conducted an expositional interview. The participants took part in this interview at the
experience-sampling lab. The interview lasted for one hour and was videotaped if the
participant had consented to videotaping. The investigator then carried out the interview.
Dr. Heavey was present for eight o f these interviews. During this interview, the
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participant was asked to describe the experience at the moment of each beep and to
collaborate with the interviewer(s) to understand the details of the experience. After six
moments of experience had been discussed, the investigator then set up another meeting
time with the participant. The participant took part in three more interviews. Within 24
hours after completing the interview, the investigator wrote up a summary of each
moment of experience. The investigator then reviewed the descriptions with Dr. Heavey.
The investigator and Dr. Heavey coded the presence o f the five most common
phenomena o f inner experience (inner speech, inner seeing, unsymbolized thoughts,
sensory awareness, and feelings) in each beep. Approximately 10 disagreements in codes
were resolved via discussion.
Following the fourth expositional interview, the investigator debriefed the participant
about the nature of the study. Debriefing consisted of describing the goals of the project,
commonly occurring experiences, and answering any question the participant had.
The data were examined in two ways. First, after each participant completed the
sampling phase, the investigator examined all the sample descriptions for that participant
to determine what, if any, characteristics were salient in that individual’s inner
experience. The investigator then wrote a description of the nature of that individual’s
inner experience, describing any salient characteristics and attempting to convey the
character or nature of that person’s inner experience. Once all of these individual profiles
had been prepared, the investigator examined the extent to which there were
commonalities or differences in the nature of the inner experience of the participants and
the extent to which any identified commonalities or differences corresponded to group
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membership (i.e., depressed group versus control group) or any other identifiable
characteristic of the individuals.
The second way in which the data were examined involved rating the character o f the
beeps related to the extent to which the experience at the sampled moments did or did not
reflect aspects of Beck’s cognitive theory of depression. To accomplish this, four
research assistants rated the extent to which the written description o f the experience at
each moment, reflected the following five constructs:
1) Depressive Content - The presence of affective (i.e., depressed mood,
worthlessness, guilt), behavioral (i.e., withdrawal, agitation), cognitive (i.e.,
difficulty concentrating, thinking, or making decisions), or physical (i.e.,
insomnia or hypersomnia, fatigue) aspects of depression.
2) Cognitive Triad - A negative view of the self, world, or future.
3) Dysfunctional Attitudes -Attitudes such as negative conclusions without support;
a focus on negative content in a situation while disregarding the rest of the
context; assumptions of failure in the future; and distorted patterns of thinking
involving minimizing positive aspects of self or experiences or inflating the
importance of negative aspects of the self or experience.
4) Automatic Thoughts - Thoughts about worthlessness, hopelessness, past failures,
or general self-derogatory beliefs or statements.
5) Valence - The overall negativity versus positivity of the experience.
The first four constructs were rated using a scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 6
(extremely). The valence construct was rated using a scale ranging from -6 (extremely
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negative) to 0 (neutral) to 6 (extremely positive). The rating instruction sheet can be

found in Appendix A.
The final rating instructions were developed through multiple revisions by Dr.
Heavey and the researcher. The initial operational definitions of the constructs were
developed based on a short summary o f the constructs. Using these initial operational
definitions, 30 random beeps were rated by a fellow psychology graduate student. Based
on the feedback from the rater and a review of these initial ratings the operational
definitions were modified. Following modifications, another 30 random beeps were
chosen and given to a psychology graduate student. Dr. Heavey, and the researcher to
rate. Interrater reliability analysis between the three raters demonstrated sufficient
reliability. The last concern addressed was that the constructs appeared to have high
intercorrelations. In order to minimize the potential for halo effects to increase the
inter correlations among the constructs. Dr. Heavey and the researcher decided to have the
raters rate only two constructs at a time.
Three UNLV undergraduate psychology students and one UNLV psychology
graduate student served as raters. The raters were instructed to rate the written
descriptions of the moments based on the construct definitions provided for them. Raters
were given two randomly chosen constructs at a time to rate for all 237 moments of
experience. The 237 moments were randomly ordered for each rater. A sample of the
moments can be found in Appendix B. Once the rater had completed the ratings for the
first two constructs he or she was assigned, he or she was given two more constructs.
This process was repeated a third time with the final construct.
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Intraclass correlation coefficients were computed for each rating dimension to
determine if the ratings o f the descriptions of the moments of experience were
sufficiently reliable. These analyses are analogous to computing a Cronbach’s alpha for
each construct except that intraclass correlation coefficients also consider absolute
agreement. Thus this is a more stringent test of inter-rater agreement than Cronbach’s
alpha. Each of the four ratings was treated as one item in the rating scale. The intraclass
correlation coefficients for each of the five rated constructs were as follows: Depressive
Content = .82; Cognitive Triad = .78; Dysfunctional Attitudes = .74; Automatic Thoughts
= .74; Valence = .95, establishing that there was sufficient agreement between the raters
to consider the ratings reliable.
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CHAPTER 4

RESULTS
Individual Participant Profile
The following are idiographic profiles of each participant. Depressed participants are
presented first, followed by nondepressed participants. Within group they are ordered
from highest BDI-II scores to lowest.

Table 1: Percentage o f Moments Rated as Being Present in the Participants Experience
Depressive Cognitive Dysfunctional Automatic Negative
Participant
Content
Triad
Attitudes
Thoughts
Valence
Depressed
Derek

25

21

8

8

42

Sheila

38

46

33

42

58

Sterling

57

44

61

65

70

Matt

58

42

21

46

79

Charles

26

22

22

22

30

Brooke

42

17

13

21

29

Aaron

33

25

29

21

33

Jared

13

21

13

13

54

Jessica

0

17

4

13

38

Trent

4

17

9

4

26

Nondepressed

Note; to be present, a moment lad an average rating of 1 or higher. Negative Valance
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Depressed Participant #1 : Derek (all names have been changed!
Derek is a 23-year-old Caucasian male living with his parents. He is a student
working on courses to complete his undergraduate degree. He reported that he was doing
well in school. He stated that he was in the midst o f a long bout with depression. While
on a mission, as a requirement for his religion, he broke down because of the stress he
experienced. Therefore, he came home before completing the mission and has since
struggled with depression. Derek claimed to be less depressed since returning from the
mission.
Over the course of his sampling days he often watched TV, worked on his computer,
and played video games. For instance, in successive moments he was watching TV,
watching TV, and working on his computer. Descriptions of these beeps are as follows:
during the first moment he was watching TV in his bedroom. He was flipping through
channels and ended up on the series called Workout. He was feeling anxious which was
associated with the sensation of “butterflies” in the left side o f his stomach. He was
watching a scene o f girls being touchy feely. During the second moment, he was
watching the Real World Challenge-Inferno 3 on Television. Some guy had just gotten
punched in the face on TV. He was feeling annoyed/tense. He was thinking you don’t
do that to other people and that he doesn’t understand why someone would do that. He
was also thinking that it was stupid for the guy to be punched in the face. He was
noticing the redness of the cut underneath the actor’s eye. Finally, during the third
moment, he was sitting at his chair and trying to get his computer set up. He was
attempting to reinstall Windows Vista. He was feeling a sense of focus that was
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experienced as good and relaxed. He was looking at the computer screen and noticing
the blues/greens/and grays of the dialog box.
He had only one moment in which he was interacting with another person. During
this particular moment, he was yelling to a friend who was far away. He was trying to
get his attention. He was yelling the word “Loren,” in a moderately loud voice. He knew
that he was trying to get his attention and that his goal was to get his attention and this
was experienced as an abstract idea in his head.
The most common forms of Derek’s experience were sensory awareness (67%) and
feelings (46%). Often he was seeing colors (44%) in his sensory awareness moments.
For example, at one moment he was in a classroom looking at a girl’s sweater in front of
him. He was noticing the yellow, green, and light green colors of the sweater. He was
looking at the contrast and depth of the colors. He was seeing the back part o f the
sweater and not her shoulders. He was also hearing noise around him that was loud and
he knew that the noise was caused by people talking.
Of note is that the left side of his stomach was frequently (42%) experienced in his
moments. For example, he was in his classroom sitting down. He had just received his
test score back. He was experiencing a feeling of excitement. He was happy and
shocked for receiving a 100 on the test when he was thinking that he was not going to do
well on the exam. He was also sensing adrenaline in his stomach on his left side that was
intense. It felt like a burst of energy the size of a cantaloupe and was warm. More than
half of those stomach moments (60%) were experienced as a sensation or feeling of pain.
For instance, he was driving in his car and feeling his stomach cramping. He was
noticing an oscillating dull sensation on the left side of his stomach about the size of a
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baseball. He was thinking and recognizing that it was hurting him. He could also hear
radio noise at a low volume.
With regard to feelings, he experienced depression-related feelings in 25% of his
beeps. These feelings accounted for more than half of his feeling moments (55%). For
example, in one moment he was standing in his room. He was feeling his stomach
hurting. There was a cramping sensation about the size of a softball that was experienced
as a dull pain. It was more pain than usual. He was feeling stressed out and it was
making him tense. He was feeling a sense of worry and anxiety throughout his body. He
felt queasy and that his muscles were contracting. He was also thinking that he didn’t
want his stomach to hurt because he had two tests to take. This thinking was occurring
without words or images.
During many moments Derek seemed to be experiencing anxiety. Forty-six percent
of his moments contained some form of anxiety. For example, he was getting ready to
leave his house. He was walking in his hallway and was looking to pick up his keys. He
had a feeling o f being in a moderate hurry. He knew that he needed to pick up the pace,
to walk fast, and to get all the tasks done. He was also thinking about the routine that he
was doing in order to leave the house. He was thinking about a step-by-step procedure of
getting his backpack, finding his keys, putting on his shoes, and then walking out the
door. All the steps were in his experience and he was on the keys step in his head.
Throughout the four interviews Derek rubbed his eye when he was asked questions or
answering questions. He would do this for at least 5-10 minutes during each interview.
He did not seem to notice that he was doing it. It appeared that this was a nervous habit.
However, it was reflected in only one moment. During this moment he was playing
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video games on his Gameboy. He had just put the Gameboy down and was scratching
his eye. He was rubbing the lower left eyelid with his left hand. He was noticing the
roughness and rubbing against the eyelid and eyeball. It was experienced as a slight
pressure. He knew in his head to scratch his eye.
Overall, Derek’s experience was filled with frequent sensations and feelings. Most of
his experiences took place while he was participating in isolated activities. In addition,
he frequently experienced depressive or anxious content in his moments. Lastly, he
experienced the left side o f his stomach in almost half of his moments.
Depressed Participant #2: Sheila
Sheila was a 19-year-old Indian female studying biology as preparation for applying
to medical school. She reported that she was doing well in school but that she was very
stressed by the difficulty of her classes. She lived with her family. She was in the midst
of a depressive episode, which she believed was caused by her friend’s recent suicide.
Sheila has had difficulty coping with the tragedy. She experienced a previous depressive
episode when she was younger.
Most of Sheila’s moments of experience involved thinking either in the form of
images (33 %) or unsymbolized thoughts (33%). She frequently was engaged in an
internal debate that might be considered mixed feelings or an internal struggle. For
example, Sheila was in her room sitting on her bed thinking about the idea o f quitting
school if/when her investments start to pay off. This was a complex thought about the
eventuality that might materialize if she is successful with investing money that would
free her up to quit school and be rich. Mixed together with this thought was her sense of
her need to not get too excited about this possibility and the realization that she wouldn’t
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be able to quit school until she was actually successful enough with the investing to give
herself a secure future. This idea had a positive sense or feeling accompanying it that
seemed like a somewhat remote experiencing of the happiness she thinks she would feel
if she was successful with her investing.
In another example, she was in her room thinking about a trip to India. She was
thinking about finding an Indian “boy.” She was feeling excited and optimistic, but also
scared and disappointed throughout her body. She felt scared and disappointed because
she didn’t want the boy to come to America and have to give up his customs, which she
believed would be a huge transition. She thought he might be depressed if he were to
come here. She was also experiencing a mental image of herself being on an auto
rickshaw with her family in the back. Four family members were in the back of the
vehicle. She was looking out to the left and seeing shops that were not modernized. The
scene looked polluted because of haze in the air.
Another example of conflict centered on her thoughts of selfishness. She was in her
room doing homework. She was thinking about her own selfishness and figuring out
why she was sad. She was correlating selfishness with being sad and how there was no
logical reason for her to be depressed. She was not feeling sad at the moment, rather she
was involved in this thought process. Thinking about selfishness continued on into her
next beep where she was in her room sitting down looking at her nails. She wasn’t
focused on her nails; instead she was focused on her thought process about selfishness.
She was trying to justify her selfishness by balancing it out by doing something else. She
was thinking about bringing a child into the world at the moment of the beep and that that
would make her selfless. The selfless realization came after the beep.
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Sheila’s daily life contained a variety of negative feelings. More specifically,
throughout sampling she experienced bitterness/disappointment, selfishness, depression,
and annoyance on multiple occasions. For example, at one moment she was watching the
show Flavor o f Love. She was really stressed out and she thought this was because o f her
biology major. She was watching the character Flavor Flav on TV and comparing herself
to him. She knew that she was never going to have as much money as this guy who has
no talent. She was saying in her head "I’m mad at Flavor Flav.” She was feeling
bitterness and cynicism in her body. She felt depressed and there was a sensation of a
little heat in her body.
Another example of a negative feeling moment occurred when she was at work,
sitting down at her computer typing. A coworker was talking to her, but she really didn’t
want to talk to him. He was telling her about his body mass index score. He was saying,
“I dropped down to 172.” He was saying this in an excited tone. She was feeling
impatient/annoyed and just wanted him to stop talking and was thinking about how much
she didn’t want to hear him anymore. She was looking at him and noticing his skin tone
around his mouth. She was noticing the unevenness of his skin.
In contrast, she had positive feelings only three times. She felt a mild sense of
happiness when she contemplated quitting school, which was described in the first
paragraph. She also experienced a feeling of excitement on two occasions. During this
depressed period of her life she experienced more feelings of depression (33%) than of
happiness (13%).
During Sheila’s first day o f sampling she experienced depressive content or irritation
in all six o f her sampled moments. These included thoughts of why she was sad, how to
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reduce selfishness, bitterness about a TV star, thoughts of her friend’s suicide, annoyance
with her brother, and disappointment with her grades. The first three beeps have been
described in previous paragraphs. The moment that included an image of her friend’s
suicide occurred when she was in her room getting ready for bed and was about to start
reading a book. She was thinking about her friend’s suicide. She was having an image
of what happened when her friend did it. The scene was mainly in black and white. She
saw the scene from about 40 feet away or at the entrance of the friend’s room. She saw
her friend in her walk-in closet. There was a belt attached to a wooden post and she saw
her firiend hanging there. She was wearing a black shirt and her hair looked stringy. Her
friend’s head was angled to the side with her hair covering her face. There were no
clothes hanging up, but some shirts on the floor of the closet. She could see part of her
friend’s bed that had a bright blue comforter. She saw this scene from first-person
perspective.
She appeared distraught by the end of the first interview. During subsequent
interviews she claimed that she tried to engage in activities when she was collecting the
beeps (e.g., working on homework, talking on the phone, and working at her job). Only 6
of the remaining 18 moments contained irritation or depressive content. An example of a
moment where she was engaged in an activity without irritation or depression was when
she was in her room and had her homework out. She was thinking about what she was
going to wear for the next day. She was having a mental image of seeing a brown shirt
and jeans out in front o f her. The clothes were in a closet sort o f floating. She was also
debating about a wearing a skirt that was experienced in the back o f her head at a low
level. The change from having frequent depressive content in her experience during the
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first sampling day to having much less when she tried to engage in more activities led
Sheila to conclude that by distracting herself she decreased the amount o f depressive
thoughts in her experience.
During many moments Sheila seemed to be experiencing anxiety. Sixty-seven
percent o f her moments contained some form of anxiety. For example, she was at work
and was working on grouping papers. She was looking at the numbers 4-5-2. She saw
these numbers in black with a white background. She was feeling worried, because a
friend had told her that he wanted to tell her something, but that they would talk about it
later. She was experiencing this worry in her chest and stomach; her chest felt tight and
her stomach felt heavy. In another example, she was working on a physics problem. She
was thinking about the formula 2II/W. She was thinking of what numbers to plug in.
She was feeling frustrated in her head with a sense of motivation to not give up. She
could also feel a headache that was experienced in the back of her head. It was
experienced from the bottom of the back o f the head to the neck and the temples. It felt
light, consistent, and painful.
Overall, Sheila’s experience was filled with frequent images or unsymbolized
thoughts. Often, she was engaged in an internal debate that might be considered mixed
feelings or an internal struggle. Most of her moments were negative and they frequently
contained thoughts or feelings that of depressive or anxious content.
Depressed Participant #3 : Sterling
Sterling is a 19-year-old Hispanic male undergraduate student. He reported that he
was doing fine in school and lived with his family. He also worked at his family-owned
restaurant. He reported that he began feeling depressed after his ex-girlfriend broke up
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with him. He stated that he has experienced depressive episodes since he was in grade
school, typically at the end of the school semester. He claims that his mom is often
critical of his grades and reacts by refusing to talk with him.
Sterling’s inner experience appeared to be characterized by frequent mental images
(83%) and feelings (78%). Sterling’s mental images often involved him, his family, or
his fiiends. An example of a mental image moment occurred when he was trying to
establish a wireless connection to his computer but couldn’t make it work. He felt angry.
He felt a mini heat burst in his forehead area. He was experiencing a mental image of
himself in a black scene with a spotlight on him from the front view. He was wearing
black trousers and a burgundy polo shirt. He saw his lips moving and hearing himself
say “why are you so retarded, why did you buy the cheap computer.” He was seeing the
scene as if he was moving around it in 360 degrees.
In another moment he had a mental image of his dad; he was thinking about what to
give his dad for his birthday. He saw an image from the 1®‘ person point of view of his
dad receiving the gift. He saw his dad in the center of the image at a table. To the left
and right of the dad were lots of family members. His dad had his hand stretched out
receiving and opening the gift but the vision ended before he could see the gift. He
recalled seeing his uncle on his dad’s right, his mom and grandma on the dad’s left, but
everyone else was faded. There was a black background and shades of blue, gray, and
green in the scene. However, his grandma was wearing orange. He also felt excitement
in his upper body that was experienced as blood rushing through his veins.
An example of a mental image of his friends occurred when he was walking out of
class. He had just seen his friend’s face, which looked sad. Sterling felt sad and down.
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which he experienced as feeling more flexible and having less muscle tension. He
visualized a scene of his friend standing up with his head looking dovm at his shoes and
then he saw himself look down as a result. He blamed himself for his friend’s sadness.
Sterling felt it was his fault for his friend not doing well and that he should have called
him to have him come over and study for the exam. Almost 90% of his mental images
involved images of himself, his friends or family members.
With regard to feeling moments, he experienced negative feelings (e.g. depression,
stress, anger, worthlessness, jealous) more often than positive feelings (e.g. happy,
excited) at an almost 2 to 1 ratio (11:6). For instance in one beep his ex-girlfriend was
talking to him on the phone and she told him that she wanted to sing happy birthday to
his dad. He thought she wanted to steal his dad from him. He felt jealousy throughout
his body, which he experienced as a numbing sensation. He visualized an image of a
competition between his ex-girlfriend and him for his dad. In this image he was in an
auditorium and seeing his dad to his left and his ex-girlfiiend on stage. She had a
microphone and was singing. She was seen from her knees up, wearing faded jeans and a
white sweater with UNLV in red letters. He had bought the sweater for her previously.
His dad was sitting down looking at her with a disinterested facial expression and
slouching posture that made it seem like he wasn’t interested in her singing. The
background had purple curtains with dim lights.
In another moment he was going to the library to renew his FAFSA financial aid
form. He was in his car, listening to music. He felt a lot of stress with a heat burst like a
mini solar flare throughout his body. He could also feel his palms sweating. He was
hoping that one of the computers was open so he could fill out the FAFSA form. He
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visualized the eight library computers from about 12 feet away. The computers were
being used on the left side of the computer room. On the right was one computer not
being used. The monitor o f the unused eomputer was blank. All the other computers had
websites on them.
With regard to positive feeling moments, he had one moment where he was at a table
inside the restaurant with his aunt and dad. He was happy at the moment because he was
bonding with his dad. He was having an image of his dad wearing shabby brown old
pants with a squared shirt. His dad was holding a baby that he believed was him when he
was a baby. He viewed this scene from in front of his dad. The baby was wearing a
white outfit and his dad was throwing the baby up in the air and catching him, holding
him close to his chest. He could see his first house in the background.
Emotional themes were also apparent in Sterling’s inner experience. Themes that
appeared in moments for Sterling were those of anxiety and depression. He experienced
anxious moments in 57% of his beeps. An example of an anxious moment occurred
when he just arrived at work and did not see his mom’s car. He was standing outside of
his family’s restaurant and noticed his aunt’s car, not his mom’s, which was unusual. He
visualized an image of a car accident in which his mom’s car had been hit by a semi
truck. He could see the front of the truck at a side angle. It was slightly damaged. As he
walked around the comer he saw his mom’s Ford Explorer. The tires were missing, the
windows were shattered, and the hood and rear door were missing. He could see a lot of
vivid blood on the driver seat and stereo. There were two drops of blood on two teddy
bears on the dashboard. The scene was in black and white. He felt sadness that was
experienced as weakness in his body. In another example, he was stepping into his car.
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he had an image of sitting at his desk looking down at the black tabletop with his test on
it. He could see that there was a red score on it, but he could not read the score. He was
worried about receiving his test grade back. He wondered if he had studied enough and if
he had reviewed everything sufficiently. He was feeling stressed. He also noticed that
the hair on his arm was standing up.
With regard to depression, 39% of his beeps contained depressive experiences. For
example, while walking to his car, his friend was telling him a story about how one of his
friends had become pregnant. Sterling visualized a wedding scene in which a fiiend that
he used to have a crush on was in a wedding dress marrying another guy. He wanted it to
be himself getting married instead of the other guy. He saw that guy as the cartoon
character Goofy because that was the guy’s nickname. The girl was on the left and
“Goofy” was on the right. He could also see himself in the scene on the left behind the
couple. The scene took place on a grassy field that had a palm tree. It was a sunny day.
He experienced the image as if someone else was watching the scene o f him and the
couple from ten feet away. He felt a little depressed, which he experienced as a loss of
energy throughout his body. He also felt his heart slowing down.
In another example. Sterling was parking his car at Marie Calendar’s restaurant. He
was just getting out of his car. He was thinking about whether he had enough money for
his dad’s birthday gift and to pay for the cleaners. He had an image of a restaurant scene
of himself and a cashier. He was opening his wallet and it was empty. He was seeing a
dark skinned cashier with hazel eyes, baby blue shirt, and a white apron. The man was
giving him a pink box with the box partly open. He could see a white frosting cake with
the words happy birthday. He saw this scene from the first-person perspective. There
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was black background. He felt like he was shrinking in size after he saw nothing in his
wallet. He felt worthless throughout his whole body.
Two themes that appeared associated with the emotional themes were thoughts of
school and the future. Fifty-two percent of his moments were about school and most of
these were related to anxiety. For example, at one moment Sterling was at work thinking
about the psychology quiz he was going to have that day. He was seeing an image of
himself sitting at a gray desk with a sheet of papers tacked to his left and one sheet in
fi-ont of him. He saw grape juice on his right side and he could barely make out a piece
of bread on a napkin in fi-ont of him. He saw his back with a white shirt and boxers. The
background had a window with brown shutters and shades of blue on the wall. He was
wondering how he was going to do on the quiz, if he had time to study, and if he had
studied enough.
An example of a moment involving the future occurred when he was taking a test and
was in the middle of answering a question that he was confident about. He felt good,
happy, and joyful all over his body. He also could see himself in a room with his parents.
They were all talking but with no sound. He saw this scene fi-om behind himself and
looking at his parents. He could see everybody from the waist up. He was only a few
feet away. His mom was on the left, TV in the background, no boundaries in the scene,
and his parents were smiling. He could see his mom’s lips moving and he could lip-read
her saying “studying paid off.” He thought he was showing his parents he was doing
well and that they were happy.
Overall, Sterling’s experience was filled with frequent mental images and feelings.
Most o f his moments involved thoughts and feelings related to family, friends, himself.
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and school. Most of Sterling’s feelings were negative and they frequently included the
experience of depression or anxiety.
Depressed Participant #4: Matt
Matt was a 19-year-old Caucasian male. He was in Psychology 101 to satisfy degree
requirements. He reported that he was doing fine in school and lived with his family. He
was in the midst of a depressive episode and claimed to have been battling depression
throughout his life.
Matt’s inner experience took on a variety of forms such as feelings (96%), sensory
awareness (67%), and unsymbolized thinking (29%). He experienced an unusually high
number o f feeling moments. Matt had more negative feelings (e.g., anxiety, anger, dread,
sad) than positive feelings (e.g., happy, relief, satisfied, anticipation) at a rate of 18 to 5.
An example of a negative feeling moment occurred when he was in his kitchen reading a
birthday card from his dad’s girlfriend. He was focused on the number 18 that was pretty
big on the card. The numbers were in black with white background. He was feeling
really angry throughout his body. His body felt really tense and his hands were clenched.
He was wondering how they could forget how old he was and why they gave him a card a
week late. He was also feeling a low level of sadness that they had forgotten his age and
date of his birthday. He also was feeling anticipation in his stomach that was experienced
as butterflies in response to waiting for his friend.
He did experience positive feeling moments, but they did not seem to last for
extended periods. For example he experienced a positive feeling moment standing by his
table discussing the birthday card (previous example) with his friend. He was joking
about how they should get drunk before the party. He was saying out loud to his friend
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“down all the beers” in a slightly elevated, joking voice. He was feeling happy which
was experienced as lightness in his body. Linked to the happy feeling was thinking he
was relieved that his anger had turned into something else. He was also looking at his
friend who was laughing and noticing his friend’s eyes.
A little while later he was experiencing the birthday card again in his awareness but
there was a negative feeling present at this moment; he was grabbing his keys to get
ready to leave his house with his friend. He was feeling worried/overwhelmed, which
was associated with a nauseous sensation in his stomach. He was worried that he wasn’t
going to make it to his appointment on time and that he had a lot of other things he had to
do. He was thinking about his birthday card that he had received earlier and that he had
to go to a barbeque for him and his brother. In addition, he did not want to go to the
barbeque because his parents couldn’t remember his age; therefore he thought he
shouldn’t go. This thought was experienced in the back of his head.
Negative feeling moments were often followed by other negative feeling moments for
Matt. For example, at one moment he was watching TV in a chair in his friend’s dorm
room. He was watching CNN and the newscasters were talking about profiling the
Virginia Tech shooter. At the same time he was seeing the shooter talking to the camera.
He saw the shooter’s head and shoulders, but was mainly focused on the shooter’s eyes.
He was feeling anger which was experienced as heat in his face. He was wondering why
they were profiling the shooter when they should be talking about the victims, that he
didn’t understand the shooter, and this was what the shooter wanted - exposure. Then he
had another negative feeling moment when he was getting his stuff together to leave his
friend’s dorm room. He was looking for his wallet prior to the beep. He was saying out
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loud “how the hell did it get here?” in an inquisitive /suspicious voice. He was feeling
dread because he was leaving and he didn’t want to go home. He was feeling in his
whole stomach a slight sensation of butterflies related to the dreadful feeling.
Matt seemed to evidence many symptoms of anxiety and depression in his moments.
Matt experienced anxiety in 38% of his moments. An example of an anxious moment
occurred when he was on his computer, typing a comment to his friend. He was
experiencing a feeling of anxiety. He felt tightness and tension in his shoulders and neck.
In the back o f his head he was wondering if she was going to find his comment funny,
that he was trying to make it funny, and he wanted his comment to be better than the one
she had left him earlier. He was also aware of typing the word “drink,” in the sentence “I
needed to get my drink on.” This was in reference to going drinking at a party. Another
anxious moment was when he was typing a paper. He was typing the word “astronomy.”
He saw the word in black, with white background, while everything else on the screen
was blurry. He was feeling worried/nervous, which was experienced as tension in his
neck/shoulders and butterflies throughout his whole stomach. He was worried about
getting his paper done. He separately was thinking about when would his friend text
message him back.
With regard to depression, 33% of his moments involved depressive content. For
example, he had multiple moments where he dreaded being alone or going home. In one,
he was in his car and had just stopped at a stoplight. He was seeing a plane take off that
was orange and blue. He was focused on the right wing of the plane and the red and
white lights were blinking. He saw the streetlights, Mandalay Bay, and MGM Grand in
the background. He was having a feeling of dread that was linked to not wanting to go
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home and he also noticed butterflies in his stomach. He was also having a feeling of
longing. Tied to this feeling was the thought of wondering where the plane was going,
wanting to be on the plane, and wanting to go somewhere else.
Matt experienced sensations in his stomach or shoulders in a high percentage o f his
moments. Forty-six percent of his moments involved noticing something with his
stomach. Most o f the time he experienced the sensation of butterflies but sometimes it
involved “going down a roller coaster.” For example he was downstairs eating dinner.
He was noticing food in his mouth, which tasted good, and was enjoying it. He was
feeling worried which was experienced as tension in his neck and shoulders. This feeling
of worry also was linked to a loss of appetite in his stomach. He knew that he couldn’t
eat all o f his food, that his stomach was sick, empty but full, and felt like he was going
down a roller coaster. Before that moment he had text messaged a friend. At the
moment of the beep, he was wondering when he would receive a reply text message from
his friend.
Twenty-one percent of his moments involved tenseness in his shoulders. Usually the
tenseness was associated with anxiety. For example he was typing his paper. While
looking at the computer screen he saw bright white on the screen. He was experiencing
his eyes being heavy and dry, like they were tired. He was also feeling worried and
stressed, which was experienced as coldness throughout his body. Tied to this feeling was
a wanting to get the paper done and wondering if he would get it done. He was also
feeling tension in his neck and shoulders and anxiety that was experienced as butterflies
in his whole stomach.
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With regard to thinking, he had a moment where he had just gotten out of his shower.
Two of his friends had left and one of his friends was supposed to come back. He was
looking down his spiral staircase in anticipation of seeing one o f his friends come back.
He was seeing the marble floor, but was focused primarily on its vivid sky blue color. He
was having feelings o f urgency and frustration that was experienced as a strong tenseness
in his shoulders and neck. Part of the feeling was wondering where his friend was and
thinking that he had to leave and she wasn’t there. Another example of thinking occurred
when he was on the computer in his friend’s dorm room. He was reading one of his
friend’s blogs. He saw the word “alone” clearly in black letters with a white background.
He could see words to the side and lines above and below “alone” but they were faded.
He was feeling confused. He was thinking that he had never seen that side of his friend,
that he didn’t expect him to write this, that he didn’t know him like he thought he did,
and that he had never talked with his friend about the things he had revealed in his blog.
His friend had written about feeling alone and depressed.
Overall, Matt’s experience was filled with frequent feelings, sensory awareness, and
unsymbolized thinking. He experienced an unusually high number of feelings in his
moments with negative feelings appearing more often than positive feelings. In addition,
his positive feelings did not appear to be sustained for long periods of time. Potentially
problematic for him is that he experienced a lot o f anxiety and depressive content in his
moments. O f note is that his stomach and shoulders were experienced in an unusually
high number of his moments.
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Depressed Participant #5: Charles
Charles is a 51-year-old Caucasian male. He had experienced depressive episodes
and alcohol abuse over the years. Currently he has been sober for a number of years but
he continues to experience symptoms of depression. He is taking antidepressant
medication and seeing a counselor to help him cope with his depression. He was a
dentist several years ago but lost his license due to excessive drinking. He was in the
process of completing courses in order to work as either a marine biologist or a nurse. He
reports doing well in school, but was stressed and depressed during the exam process. He
was living by himself when he participated in the study.
Charles’s inner experience included frequent thoughts or memories of his past.
Forty-eight percent o f the moments were about his past experiences. The contents of
these moments of experience were either tragic or pleasurable. For example, a tragic
moment involved emailing a friend about his alcoholic past. He was feeling remorse and
sadness. He described this feeling as a huge sense of despondency. It was accompanied
by a nauseous feeling in his stomach. He also had an image of a head-on car crash
viewed from the side from about 50 feet away. In his image the cars were just coming
into contact; this image was a reconstruction of a crash he was involved in years ago
while he was driving drunk. He doesn’t remember the details of the crash because he
was drunk, but this was the image he had recreated of what he thought it was like. The
cars in his image were generic and lacked details such as color.
An example of a moment of experience that was related to a pleasurable experience
from his past occurred when he was talking to his friend from Colorado on the phone.
They were discussing Colorado University and what they had called “Friday Afternoon
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Club.” At the moment of the beep he was listening to what his friend was saying about
Friday Afternoon Club and reminiscing about a girl he was dating at that time. He was
experiencing an image of six people sitting around a table by the window at the Sink
restaurant. He saw himself, his girl sitting to his left, and a guy sitting across from him as
if from about 15-20 feet away at a slight slant.
Of interest was the intensity of some of Charles’s moments of experienee. He
experienced them as if he were reliving the actual event with enthralling detail and
vividness. For example, in one moment while he was returning an email to his friend he
was reflecting on a past event involving skiing. He was experiencing a mental image of
himself racing down a ski slope with his friend. He saw this from the first-person
perspective. He was moving and could see his black skis, moguls about 30 feet ahead,
and trees off to each side. He did not see any other people. He experienced the idea that
he was going to beat his friend. He also was experiencing exhilaration similar to what he
had felt during the actual skiing; this felt like an adrenaline rash and lightness through his
body.
Charles tended to experience the world in images (74%) and feelings (35%). More
than half of his images contained moments about his past, while half of those moments
were reflections of depressive incidents. For instance, in one moment he was riding his
bike against oncoming traffic. Prior to the beep going off, he was almost in an accident.
When the beep went off he was aware of his heart pounding and the experience of an
“adrenalin rash” as a result. He was also experiencing a visual image of a time in which
he did get into a bike accident in circumstances similar to his recent near miss. He saw
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this image from his own perspective. In the image he was falling to the ground; visually
this seemed as if the pavement was racing up at him.
Of his feelings moments, more than half of them centered on sadness or anger. For
instance, he was riding his bike back home from the store after he had bought a pint of
ice cream. He had an image o f himself being overweight. More specifically, he was
visualizing only his midsection of his stomach from a front view with shirt off from the
top of his swim trunks to the top o f his stomach as if seen from about 10 feet in front of
him. In the image his stomach was sticking out about six inches more than actual
stomach size. He had a sense that the image represented him being overweight; he also
had a sense that the image was of him in Cancun, though there were no other details in
the picture. In addition, he was feeling angry and despondent about buying the ice cream
when he is trying to watch his weight.
It is apparent that Charles had numerous moments of depressive symptomatology
reflected in his inner experience. Some of these moments included thoughts about being
overweight, alcoholism, accidents, the meaning of depression, and confrontations.
Another example o f a depressive moment of experience occurred while Charles was
riding his bike uphill. Before the beep he had been thinking about the John Denver song
“Annie.” He believed this song often depressed him. At the moment of the beep he had a
visual image of riding up a chair lift in Aspen, Colorado. He saw straight ahead with Bell
Mountain to his left, a ski run straight ahead, and trees off to each side. The weather was
clear and he was half way up the ski lift. The scene had appropriate colors but did not
have people in it. He also was experiencing a feeling of melancholy that he described as
a longing. It was as accompanied by a physical sensation in his gut. Charles endorsed the
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idea that whenever he listens to John Denver’s music he becomes depressed because he
connects with the lyrics.
Overall, Charles’s experience is filled with frequent images and feelings. Most of his
thoughts or memories were of his past. Most of his feelings were negative and they
frequently included the experience of depression.
Depressed Participant #6: Brooke
Brooke is a 19-year-old Hispanic female. She was completing Psychology 101 as
part o f her degree requirements. She reported that she was doing well in school and lived
with her family. She was in the midst of a depressive episode that coincided with her
boyfriend being arrested and jailed. She claimed to be struggling significantly with the
situation, having lost 15-20 pounds in two weeks. Overall, she was unusually cheerful
during the interview process for the symptoms that she endorsed. It was learned after the
interviews that she had dropped one of her classes. Brooke claimed to have never been
depressed prior to the situation with her boyfriend.
Brooke experienced life for the most part in feelings (79%) and sensations (46%).
The majority of her feeling moments were positive (e.g., happy, giddy, excited, silly)
rather than negative (e.g., upset, irritated, nervous, cranky) at an almost 2 to 1 ratio
(11:6). For example she experienced positive feelings when she was at her work and she
had just finished talking with some friends. She was feeling very excited and happy. She
was just told by her boss that she was going to do a modeling shoot for her company.
She was thinking that she couldn’t wait for the next week to come so she could do the
shoot. She noticed a smirked expression around her whole mouth that was experienced
as tightness. Another example o f a positive feeling moment occurred when she was
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buying concert tickets online at home for her sister and her sister’s boyfriend for a
graduation present. She was feeling happy and excited in her entire body. She was
thinking that she hoped that her sister would be excited, that she’d better be excited, that
she was getting her sister a graduation present, and that although she is paying for it, she
should not have. An example of a negative feeling moment was when she was in her bed,
trying to go to sleep. She was listening to music. She was hearing the words “my girls in
the next room.” She was feeling upset and this was experienced in a part of her heart.
She was also saying to herself “I can relate to that.”
Of note was the fact that she experienced five moments (21%) in which there was a
feeling that had both positive and negative aspects, such as: sad/happiness,
happy/missing, cranky/tired/laughing, giddy/antsy and excited/nervous. An example of a
moment where this happened was when she went to the gym to work out. She was in the
middle o f doing a back exercise when the beep went off. She was feeling a sad kind of
happiness throughout her whole body. At this moment she was thinking about missing
home which was associated with seeing a mental image of a track meet. She saw her and
her three friends talking. The friends were two girls and a guy. They were in front of a
yellow touchdown post. There was green grass and the background contained a shed,
triple jump pit, and high jump. They were trying to antagonize their coach. Everybody
was having a good time and she could see everybody’s whole body.
Another example of a mixed feeling occurred when she was chatting online with her
friend. She was reading his message about the mission that he was going on. She was
focused on the word “mission” on the screen. She was experiencing the feeling of
happiness and missing him in her heart. She could hear his voice in her head saying
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“going on a mission.” He was saying it in a frustrated voice. She was thinking, What
can I do to make him feel better? He is my best friend; and that she needed to be careful
about what she said to him.
Besides having feelings in a lot o f moments, 46% of her moments had sensory
awareness. An example of a sensory awareness moment was when she was sitting on the
counter at work. She was feeling tired/exhausted/cranky/fussy throughout her body. She
noticed that her feet hurt as there was a painful, burning sensation consuming both.
Another example o f sensory awareness occurred in a moment when she was cleaning her
room at home. She was listening to music and dancing at the same time. She was
listening and hearing the beat of the music at a fast tempo, which was the focus of her
awareness. She was dancing and was in the middle of doing a cheerleader clap. She
could feel the music throughout her body and her muscles. She was making sharp moves
and counting the beats to each move. She was feeling really good and relaxed throughout
her body.
During many moments Brooke seemed to be experiencing anxiety. Sixty-seven
percent o f her moments contained some form of anxiety, such as discussing new
protocols at work, going shopping with a friend, and reviewing notes for an exam.
Examples of these moments are as follows: she was at her work and talking with her
boss. She was feeling irritated and tense throughout her body. It was experienced as a
sharp pain spiraling down from her neck through her spine. She was thinking that she
wanted to throw something or hit someone. In addition, she was thinking that it was
dumb o f the owner to institute “check ups” on the workers. The second example
involved her talking with a coworker at work. They were talking about going shopping.
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Brooke was feeling gitty and antsy throughout her whole body. She described it as just
wanting to go shopping, that she couldn’t sit still, and she felt like a little kid. She was
thinking that this is the first time she was shopping with a friend that was not a guy, her
sister, or cousin. She was also wondering how much money she could spend. A third
example o f anxiety was when she was reviewing psychology notes at home in her room.
She had an exam in psychology in two hours and she was feeling nervous about it. She
was experiencing knots and butterflies in the middle of her stomach. It was experienced
as a strong pain and the pain seemed like it was floating while also having numerous
contractions. In her notes, she was reading about the superego, ego, id, and people’s
attitudes and behaviors. The words were in pink letters with a white background. She
was trying to relate her notes to something in her life and she was saying in her head
“which one of my friends is like this?”
O f note was a couple of moments where she was feeling relaxed, potentially
indicating that because she worries a lot, it is very recognizable to her when she is
relaxed. For example, at one moment she was driving her car and listening to music. She
was paying attention to the beat. She was hearing a fast tempo and listening to the
drums. The music was really loud. She was feeling good. She was in a good mood and
had nothing to worry about. She felt relaxed in her whole body. Her body felt light and
as though it was going with the flow of the music.
Overall, Brooke’s experience was filled with frequent feelings and sensations. With
regard to feelings, she experienced more positive feeling moments than negative feeling
moments. She sometimes had atypical experiences of feelings that were mixtures of
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positive and negative emotions. Potentially problematic is that she experiences a high
number of moments o f anxiety.
Control Participant #1 : Aaron
Aaron was an 18-year-old Caucasian male. He reported no history of psychological
problems nor was he experiencing any symptoms of depression. He was in the process of
completing his first year of college and reported that he was not doing as well as he
would have liked in school. He lived at home with his family.
Aaron’s inner experience predominantly contained thoughts or feelings focused on
his girlfriend. For seventy-five percent (18 of 24) of his moments the primary focus or
content was his girlfiiend. These moments mainly took the form o f missing her or
recognizing how much she means to him. For instance in one beep he was in the middle
of text messaging his girlfriend. He had a thought about really missing her and was
experiencing the feeling of missing her. More specifically, he was missing her more than
usual, as if he were never going to see her again. In another moment he was on his couch
and text messaging his girlfiiend. He was having an overwhelming feeling that he was
truly in love with her. He had a thought of being happier than he has ever been, that she
meant a lot to him, and that he loved her. He also had a feeling o f weight lifting off his
shoulders. This weight lifting off him made him feel better.
Aaron’s inner experience took on a variety of forms such as feelings, images, and
unsymbolized thoughts. He experienced feelings in 58% of his moments and, of these,
85% were centered on his girlfiiend. The feelings associated with his girlfriend were
mainly happiness (75%) and missing her (17%). For example, at one beep he was at his
girlfriend’s and he had just kissed her. He was having a physical sensation of
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blissfulness, perfection, connection, and meaningfulness throughout his entire body. An
example of him missing her was when he was text messaging his girlfriend and he was
thinking about missing his girlfriend. He had a sense of something missing. He felt he
was almost in a peaceful setting, but didn’t feel whole, so that is why he felt something
was missing. He felt like something was out of place and that time was standing still.
He had five images; four of these were o f his girlfriend. Interestingly he experienced
bluish tint in two o f these four images and both o f these were experienced when he was
focused only on seeing his girlfriend’s face. For example, he was sitting on his couch
watching TV. He had a mental image of his girlfriend smiling and saying “I love you.”
He was hearing her say it in her voice but a little bit quieter than normal volume. The
image that he experienced was of her face and her mouth was moving towards a smile.
In his image, he saw from the top of her head down to her neck. He saw it from his own
perspective and saw her face as a light shade of blue and her hair as brown and blue. The
background was black and he experienced this in his head. The bluish tint was the
primary color present during both of his image moments.
He experienced unsymbolized thoughts in 33% of his moments. Half of these
thoughts were when he was in the process of receiving or sending a text message to his
girlfriend. For instance in one beep, he had just received a message from his girlfriend
prior to the beep saying “I’m in love with you, because you make me happy. I can
depend on you for comfort.” When the beep hit, he was in the process of thinking that he
knew this was the truth, that she meant every word of it, and he knew that she loved him.
He had eight moments where he was receiving or sending a text message to her and four
o f these eight moments contained unsymbolized thoughts. Lastly, 75% of Aaron’s
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moments were experienced when he was sitting on his couch. The other 25% o f his
moments were collected when he was spending time with his girlfriend. The first three
days o f sampling he was at home by himself while the last day of sampling, he spent
with his girlfriend. Thus the predominance of thoughts about his girlfriend may be due to
sampling bias.
Overall, Aaron’s experience was filled with frequent feelings and unsymbolized
thoughts. Most of his moments involved thoughts and feelings related to his girlfriend.
In addition, most o f his feeling moments revolved around the state of being happy.
Control Participant #2: Jared
Jared was a 19-year-old Hawaiian male. He had no history of psychological
problems nor had he experienced symptoms o f depression. He was in his first year of
college and reported that he was not doing well. He lived in the dorms with a roommate.
Jared’s inner experience took on a variety of forms such as mental images (58%),
sensory awareness (54%), and inner speech (33%). An example o f a mental image
occurred when he was eating pizza at the dining commons. He was imagining a scene in
his head in which he was focused on an orange colored grease spot on top of his pizza. It
was shiny and glossy and located on the middle of the slice. He imagined seeing his arm
from the forearm to his hand about to dab the grease of the pizza. He could see his hand
with a folded napkin moving slowly towards the pizza. The pizza was on a pink plate,
which was on a brown round table. He could see three or four people who were blurry in
the background. The people were blocking a huge black television, which made up the
entire background.
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His mental images did not have any obvious themes. However, four of his moments
had side-by-side images. An example of the side-by-side moment was when he was
looking at the website NBA.com. He was looking up Marvin Williams’s career stats. He
visualized two side-by-side images. The right image was of an Atlanta Hawks jersey
from the 1980’s Dominique Wilkins era. The jersey was red, with white borders, and
yellow words. The image on the left was of a player by the name of Sheldon Williams.
Sheldon was wearing a brown polo shirt and sitting in the middle of a crowd at a game.
He could see three rows up and two rows down while also seeing about four to five
people to the left and right of Sheldon.
In another example of as side-by-side mental image moment occurred when he was
about to go to sleep. He was thinking about getting up early and going to the dining
commons the next day. He was experiencing side-by side images in his head. On the left
side of his head he saw a picture of the dining commons. He could see the pink post and
the wall as if you were looking at it from Central Desert Complex building 6. He could
see black asphalt and stretching pavement in the background. On the right side of his
image he could see the chef from his chest up. He was wearing a white cooking shirt and
a black chef hat. He had white curly hair sticking out like a froe underneath the hat on
both sides of his head. He was described as having a pink face, old looking, and
disgruntled facial expression. The images were right next to each other.
He experienced sensory awareness 54% of the time. Throughout his beeps he
experienced at least one moment with every sense of the body. For example he
experienced the sense of touch when he was drinking hot chocolate at his dorm room. He
was holding the cup in his hands. He was focused on the hotness of the cup on his left
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fingertips and palm. It felt warm in his hand. He could also see the color o f the
chocolate and noticing the light brownness o f it. He was saying to himself “is it too
watery,” in his voice in his head.
He experienced the sense of sight in when he was watching the 3-6 music video. He
was focused on one o f the singer’s teeth. He saw dark silver grills that were spaced apart.
He was focused on the top row of teeth and upper lip. He noticed that his teeth are
spaced apart more than usual.
He experienced the sense of hearing when he was on his computer playing the game
“minesweeper.” He was hearing the click, click, click sound o f clicking the mouse. He
knew he was clicking the mouse. He noticed his hands were sweating. The experience
was clamminess and was felt on the top of the mouse as well as the right three most
fingers and the right side of his palm.
He experienced the sense of taste when he was eating a Subway sandwich in his
room. He was looking at the peppers in his sandwich and was noticing the yellowness o f
the peppers. He describes the pepper’s yellow color to be similar to that of light colored
urine. At the moment of the beep he could also taste in his mouth a hot mild sensation
from eating the peppers. The sensation was tingly, and was experienced on the right
comer o f his lips and his tongue.
Finally, he experienced the sense of smell when he was walking to his dorm room.
He was passing by people who were smoking cigarettes. He could smell the cigarette
smoke in both his nostrils. It was a very strong smell and he recognized it as menthols.
He said to himself, “gross.” He was also seeing an image of a cloud of smoke in his head.
It was a large amount o f smoke that was gray in color. The middle was darker than the
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outside. The background of the image contained grass and a building. The smoke took
up most o f the image.
Inner speech appeared in 33% of his moments. For instance in one moment he was
standing up in his room about to go to class. He said to himself in his head, “I need to
take out the trash.” He also saw a mental image o f a white trash bag that was full and tied
up to the right of a black refrigerator. The refrigerator had a grey handle. The
background of the scene was a lighter shade of black.
Overall, Jared experienced the world in a variety o f forms with the main themes that
o f mental images, sensory awareness, and inner speech. He sometimes had atypical
experiences of mental images that took the form of side-by-side mental images.
Furthermore he did not appear to have any particular senses that dominated the majority
of his moments. Of note was that there was only one experience o f an unsymbolized
thought or feeling in his moments.
Control Participant #3: Jessica
Jessica was a 19-year-old Caucasian female. She was taking Psychology 101 to
satisfy her degree requirements. She reported that she was doing fine in school and lived
with her family. She had experienced a depressive episode when she was 17 as a result
of being raped. She reported she was doing well as evidenced by the statement, “I am the
happiest I have ever been.”
Jessica’s inner experience took on a variety o f forrris such as sensory awareness, inner
speech, and unsymbolized thoughts. She experienced sensory awareness in 50% o f her
moments. For instance in one moment she was in her bathroom, particularly intent on
brushing her teeth. She was looking in the mirror and noticing herself brushing her teeth.
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She was seeing the toothbrush (mechanical) and watching the toothbrush going across the
top and bottom rows of her teeth. She also tasted a strong taste of cinnamon toothpaste
on her tongue.
Seventy-five percent o f her sensory awareness involved visual stimuli. An example
of a moment with visual stimuli was when she was in her room watching the TV show
“Law & Order.” She was looking at her bracelet and noticing the blueness and whiteness
of it. She saw the blue as a light sky blue color and the white as a diamond looking
white. She was saying in her head “I need to clean my bracelet.”
She experienced inner speech 25% of the time and unsymbolized thoughts appeared
in 21% o f her moments. An example o f an inner speech moment was when she was in
her room and sending a text message to her fiiend. She was thinking about what she was
going to send to him. She was saying to herself “Oh no, go to sleep. I’ll talk to you
later.” This was said in her own voice. An instance of an unsymbolized thought
appeared when she was lying on the floor of her room organizing her dresser drawer.
Prior to the beep, she had just found an ink cartridge for her printer that she didn’t know
she had. She was trying to remember whether the cartridge would fit her current printer.
She was debating between the numbers 92, 93, and 99 as to which one was the one
needed for her printer.
Jessica’s experience was simple in the sense that 38% of her moments had only one
experience. For example she was in her room on her computer looking at myspace.com.
She was thinking to herself that she needed to check her rebel email account. In another
example she was in her room watching the program CSI on television. She saw a scene
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where a dead girl was lying with her head on the toilet. Jessica focused on the dead girl’s
hair. It was red, long and straight. She noticed nothing else at that moment.
It also seemed like verbal speech was dominant in her awareness. This was
evidenced by talking (17%) or inner speech (25%) in 42% of her moments. An example
of a talking moment, she told her friend on the phone “Scott was an asshole tonight at
work.” There was nothing else in her awareness at the moment of the beep. An example
of inner speech in a moment occurred when she was watching a movie in her bedroom.
She was feeling exhausted which was experienced as a feathery lightness in her body and
a recognition that her eyes were getting heavy. This was felt throughout her eyelids. She
said to herself in her head, “I need a Starbucks.”
The context of most o f Jessica’s moments was her presence in her bedroom. The
activities primarily involved were watching TV, doing schoolwork, and using her phone
or computer. However, these last two statements may be due to sampling bias.
Overall, Jessica experienced the world in a variety of forms with the main themes
being sensory awareness, inner speech, and unsymbolized thoughts. Verbal speech
appeared to be a theme in Jessica’s experience as well.
Control Participant #4: Trent
Trent was an 18-year-old Caucasian male. He had no history of psychological
problems nor was he experiencing symptoms of depression. Trent was in his first year of
college and reported that he was doing very well in school. He lives at home with his
family.
Trent’s inner experience appeared to be characterized by the use o f words. Eightyseven percent of his moments contained experiences of talking to himself, talking out
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loud, reading, hearing words in his head, or listening to someone talk. Trent’s most
salient experience was the expression of language in his head as 47% of his moments
contained either talking or hearing words in his head. For example, he was sitting out at
the pool with his mom. He was saying to himself, “What could be wrong with the
[Jacuzzi] jet?” He experienced this mental speaking as being in his head.
It appears that Trent had an active social life. He was talking or listening to someone
during 38% o f his moments. For instance, in three consecutive beeps he was talking or
listening to someone: He was talking to a friend and he was looking at an exhaust for his
car. He was saying to his friend “Do they make Corsa exhaust for the 350Z?” Following
that beep, he was walking to a class and listening to his friend talk about an upcoming
fight on the weekend. His friend was saying, “I got a fight this weekend.” The third beep
involved him listening to his sociology teacher. He was focused on looking at him. The
teacher was walking back and forth, pacing. He was listening to his professor say “.. .in a
culture of that sort...”
Trent’s inner experiences often revolved around motor vehicles, school, and women.
Twenty-six percent of his moments revolved around thoughts or discussion involving
parts for his car, potential car purchases, and research about cars. For example, he was
sitting at his kitchen counter and thinking about buying a chopper motorcycle. More
specifically, he was looking at his computer and debating between a Harley motorcycle
and Big Dog Chopper motorcycle. At the moment of the beep, he was thinking about
whether his parents will let him get it. He was saying in his own voice in his head “Are
they going to say yes?” In addition, 17% of his moments were about school and 13% of
the moments were about women. An example of a school related moment was that he
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was in the middle o f writing a cover page in his room. He had just written, “I chose this
topic because....” He was rereading this to himself in a louder voice than normal in his
head. He was saying, “I chose this topic because.” He saw black letter with a white
background.
An example of a moment about the opposite sex occurred as he was l)dng in bed
watching a movie. He was thinking about the possibility of sex with a forty-year-old
woman. He was hearing in the back of his head in a whisper in his own voice, “For forty
years old, she’s still sexy. I wonder what that’s like?” These three categories were in his
experience over the course of three sampling days (1, 2, & 4). However, on the third
sampling day, Trent said he was just relaxing. Interestingly, none of these three
categories appeared in any of his moments that day. What appeared the most were a lot
of sensation-focused moments. For example, during one beep he was trying to fix the
filter in the pool. He was turning the filter handle. He could feel the lettering on the
filter handle in the palm of his hands. He could feel a slight pressure on his hands with
skin being pressed inward. Trent experienced sensory awareness on five of six moments
that day compared to only 4 of 17 moments over the other three days.
Overall, Trent’s experience contained the frequent expression of language. This
mainly took the forms of talking to himself, talking out loud, reading, hearing words in
his head, or listening to someone talk. Often Trent’s experiences revolved around motor
vehicles, school, and women.
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Group-Level Characteristics of Experience
Table 2 presents the percentage of sampled moments that contained each of the five
most common phenomena of inner experience (inner speech, inner seeing, unsymbolized
thought, feeling, and sensory awareness) for each participant as well as the mean and
standard deviation percentages for the depressed and nondepressed groups.

Table 2: Frequency o f Five Phenomena of Inner Experience
Inner
Inner
Participant
Unsymbolized
Speech Seeing
Thinking
Depressed

Feeling

Sensory
Awareness

Derek

.13

.00

.21

.46

.63

Sheila

.08

.38

.33

.67

.00

Sterling

.04

.83

.13

.78

.26

Matt

.08

.00

.29

.96

.67

Charles

.04

.57

.17

.35

.04

Brooke

.13

.04

.25

.83

.46

Mean

.08

.28

.23

.67

.34

SD

.04

.35

.07

.23

.29

Aaron

.04

.21

.33

.58

.08

Jared

.33

.67

.04

.04

.50

Jessica

.25

.04

.21

.04

.50

Trent

.35

.09

.04

.09

.35

Mean

.24

.25

.15

.18

.35

SD

.14

.29

.14

.26

.20

Nondepressed
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As can be seen in this table, there was substantial individual variability in the relative
frequency of inner seeing, feelings, and sensory awareness. There was less variability in
inner speech and unsymbolized thinking. There were two categories of experience for
which there were notable group differences. The depressed group had substantially less
frequent inner speech than did the control group. This difference was significant, f(8) = 2.66,/) < .05, d - 2.7. Additionally, depressed participants experienced feelings much
more frequently than did nondepressed participants. This difference was also significant,
^ (8) = 3.1,/) < .05, d = 2.0. The other frequent phenomena of inner experience appeared
with similar frequencies across groups.
Looking beyond the five most frequent phenomena of inner experience, an informal
examination o f the nature of the sampled moments of experience revealed that 20% of the
depressed group’s moments of experience contained explicitly depressive content
whereas this was true for only 3% of the control group’s samples. An even larger
discrepancy was found in the number of experiences that contained anxiety content.
Using a similarly informal survey of the moments of experience, 32% of all depressed
participant’s sampled moments contained manifest anxiety compared to only 3% o f the
control participants’ sampled moments.
As discussed earlier, feelings were more often experienced within the depressed
participants’ sampled moments than the control participants’ sampled moments. Upon
further examination the depressed group evidenced a higher rate of moments where
negative feelings were present compared to moments where positive feelings were
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present at a rate of about 5 to 3. This same ratio was not evidenced in the control
participant’s sampled moments in which the ratio appeared to be about 1 to 1.
Individual raters rated each moment for their overall positivity, negativity, or
neutrality on a Likert scale. Moments were then classified as positive if the average
rating o f the moment was considered slightly to extremely positive; negative if the
average rating of the moment was considered slightly to extremely negative; and neutral
if the average ratings did not reach slightly positive or slightly negative. With regard to
the overall positivity, negativity, or neutrality of each individual moment, the depressed
group evidenced substantially more moments that had a negative or positive tone than did
the control group. More specifically 57% o f depressed participant’s sampled moments
had a negative or positive tone, while only 26% of the control participant’s sampled
moments had a negative or positive tone. Within each group’s sampled moments, the
depressed group experienced more moments with a negative tone than a positive tone at a
rate of 5 to 3, while the control group experience a similar amount o f negative and
positive moments at a rate of 1 to 1.
Comparisons between the depressed and control participants’ experiences using the
five rated constructs were also done via a series of independent samples t tests. The
results o f these tests are shown in Table 3. The t test for ratings of depression was
significant and showed a very large effect size. The other t tests were not significant, but
all showed a large effect size in the expected direction.
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Table 3: Comparison o f Control and Depressed Subjects on the Five Rated Experience
Constructs

Construct

Depression
Cognitive
Triad
Dysfunctional
Attitudes
Automatic
Thoughts
Valence

Control
Group Mean
(SD)
.38 (.21)

Depressed
Group Mean (SD)
1.03 (.38)

t

d

3.06*

-2.17

.42 (.12)

.84 (.47)

-1.70

-1.20

.29 (.17)

.76 (.61)

-1.5

-1.05

.31 (.13)

.82 (.45)

-2.16

-1.53

.12 (.75)

-.56(1.04)

1.11

.79

Overall Rated
-.62 (.18)
.47(1.00)
-2.10
-1.49
Depression
Control n = 4; Depressed n = 6; df = 8; * p < .05; Depression, Cognitive Triad,
Dysfunctional Attitudes, and Automatic Thoughts rated on scale ranging from 0 to 6;
Valence rated on scale ranging from —6 to 6

Convergence of Sampling and Questionnaire Data
Finally, I examined the extent to which the ratings of the four constructs for the
moments of experience converged with the self-report questionnaires assessing the
parallel constructs. To conduct these analyses I averaged each rating construct across all
moments of experience for each individual. This resulted in one overall score reflecting
the average extent to which each construct was reflected in that participant’s moments of
experience. I then correlated these scores with the scores on the four self-report
questionnaires. These correlations can be seen in Table 4. Three of four convergence
correlations, found on the diagonal in Table 4, were significant and the fourth narrowly
missed statistical significance. However, all of the other off-diagonal correlations were
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also positive and many reached statistical significance as well. In fact, the average o f the
on-diagonal and off-diagonal correlations was effectively identical at .63. Thus there was
little evidence that the convergence was due to variance unique to the individual
constructs. Rather it appeared that there was a unitary underlying dimension accounting
for the strength of these relationships.

Table 4: Correlations Among Self-Report Questionnaires and Ratings of Moments of
Experience.
Beck
Dysfunctional
Cognitive
Automatic
Triad
Depression
Attitudes Scale
Thoughts
Inventory
Inventory-II
Questionnaire
.64*
.75*
Depression
.68*
.62
Cognitive
Triad
Dysfunctional
Attitudes
Automatic
Thoughts
* p < .05, df = 8

.50

.66*

.61

.63

.42

.65*

.57

.59

.59

.72*

.79*

.65*

To explore the possibility of a unitary underlying dimension further, I examined the
intercorrelations of the ratings and questionnaires, shown in Tables 5 and 6, respectively.
As can be seen in these two tables, all of the constructs were strongly positively
correlated.
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Table 5: Correlations A m ong Five Rated Constructs

Depression

Cognitive
Triad
.83

Dysfunctional
Attitudes
.75

Automatic
Thoughts
.84

Cognitive
1
.87
.83
Triad
Dysfunctional
1
.81
Attitudes
1
Automatic
Thoughts
N = 237; All values significant at p < .001; Valence is reversed.

Table 6: Correlal ions Among Depression Questionnaires
Construct
Beck
Cognitive
Dysfunctional
Depression
Triad Inventory
Attitudes Scale
Inventory - II
1
BDI-II
.87
.89
.97
CTI
1
1
DAS
N = 10; All correlations significant at p < .01
-

Valence
.72
.70
.60
.67

Automatic
Thoughts
Questionnaire
.81
.73
.79

Finally, given the evidence suggesting that both the rated constructs and the selfreport questionnaires may be tapping a unitary underlying dimension, I conducted one
final set of exploratory analyses by created a new overall rating variable and a new
overall self-report variable. For each variable, the five rated constructs or the four selfreport questionnaires were z-transformed and then averaged together. Thus each
individual had one overall score for the ratings of the moments of experience and one
overall score for the self-report questionnaires. These overall scores were conceptualized
as broadly reflecting the construct of depression as seen either through moments of
experience or subject self-report. The correlation of these two created variables with
each other was again strongly positive (r (8) = .73, p < .05). This correlation is somewhat
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stronger than the average o f all the convergence correlations (.63) shown in Table 4.
Thus although there is evidence for convergence of self-report questionnaires and the
nature o f the momentary experiences, it appeared to be more attributable to a global
underlying dimension of depression than to the more narrow constructs delineated in
Beck’s cognitive theory o f depression.
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CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION
The main goal o f this study was to examine the experience of depressed and
nondepressed individuals, exploring the extent to which the specific constructs identified
in Beck’s cognitive theory of depression were differentially reflected in the momentary
experiences of depressed individuals and looking for any other differences in the
momentary experiences. Overall, it was apparent that depressive content occurred more
often in depressed participants’ sampled moments than nondepressed participants’
sampled moments. Although depressive content was evident in the depressed
participants’ sampled moments, there did not appear to be any consistent depressive
content themes among depressed participants. For instance it appeared that depressed
participant Sheila often experienced depressive content within her thought content o f her
sampled moments; depressed participant Matt often experienced the “feeling” of
depression within his sampled moments; and depressed participant Sterling often
experienced the theme of depression while he was experiencing inner seeing in his
sampled moments. Though there didn’t appear to be a consistent theme across depressed
participants, there did appear to be themes that differentiated the depressed and
nondepressed groups. Specifically, distinctions could be made regarding the forms of
experience, the feelings that were present, the tone o f the moment, the sensations
experienced in the body, and anxiety content.
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With regard to the form of experience, depressed participants appeared to have
substantial individual variability in the relative frequency o f inner seeing, feelings, and
sensory awareness. However, there was less individual variability in inner speech and
unsymbolized thinking between the depressed participants. The most salient
characteristics o f the depressed group were feelings and sensory awareness. Perlotto
(2003) also found feelings and sensory awareness as the most frequently occurring forms
o f experience in depressed participants’ sampled moments.
The frequency o f the forms o f experience also appeared to be asignificant difference
between depressed and nondepressed participants. Specifically, there were differences in
the frequency of the forms of the experience between the groups with regard to inner
speech and feelings. Inner speech was found at a lower rate in the depressed participant’s
sampled moments compared to the control participant’s sampled moments. This is
consistent with a previous study that found a negative correlation between the frequency
of inner speech and psychological distress (Heavey & Hurlburt, under review).
Another form of experience that was significantly different between the groups was
feelings. Feelings appeared more frequently in the depressed participant’s sampled
moments compared to the control participant’s sampled moments. Cavenagh (2003) also
found a higher percentage of feelings among depressed participants compared to
nondepressed participants.
The depressed participants’ sampled moments contained frequent experiences of
feeling sad, hopeless, despondent, dread, or disappointment. There was a higher rate of
negative feeling moments compared to positive feeling moments within the depressed
group. Similarly, Perlotto (2001) found a higher rate of negative feeling moments
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compared to positive feeling moments in the depressed group (4 to 1) than she did in the
nondepressed group (1 to 1). The high frequency with which depressed participants’
experienced negative feelings suggests that they experienced difficult emotions at an
alarming rate. The result o f having such a high frequency of depressive feelings may
contribute to the maintenance of a depressive state.
Another distinction between the groups was the overall tone of the moments. The
control group primarily experienced neutral moments, whereas the depressed group
primarily experienced positive or negative moments. This suggests that the depressed
individuals experienced more highs and lows in their daily lives.
In addition, the depressed group had an overall negative mean for the rated valence of
their experiences, which differed from the nondepressed group who evidenced an overall
positive mean for daily experiences. This finding corresponds with those of Cavenagh
(2003) who found negative experiences were more evident in depressed participants
sampled moments.
Another interesting finding was that there were frequent moments within the
depressed participants’ sampled experiences that focused on sensory areas o f the
stomach, neck, shoulders, or back. Often these sensations were experienced
simultaneously with a negative feeling or negative thought. This is an important finding
as somatization symptoms such as backaches, neck aches, and gastrointestinal pain have
high comorbidity with depressive symptoms (Eystein, Ingvar, Alv, & Amstein, 2003).
Thus somatization symptoms were prevalent in certain individuals who were
experiencing depressive symptoms. Furthermore, a study conducted by Hurlburt (1993)
found that depressed participants experienced emotional processing outside of awareness.
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One o f the depressed participants reported the frequent existence of emotional processing
in his physical body, but didn’t recognize these emotions in his awareness at the moment
of the beep. For example, Derek who had the highest BDI-II score o f the participants,
but lowest amount of depressive content, reported frequent agitation throughout his body,
often unaware of his feelings.
Another disorder that often co-occurs with depression is anxiety (Clayton et. al.,
1991). This study found explicitly anxious content evidenced in the depressed group at a
much higher rate compared to the control group. The evidence in this study suggests that
anxiety occurs at around the same rate as depression does in depressed participants’
experience. This supports the frequent finding o f high comorbidity between these
disorders.
The central goal of this study was to determine if the specific constructs identified in
Beck’s cognitive theory of depression were reflected in the momentary experiences of
depressed individuals. The four constructs - depression, cognitive triad, dysfunctional
attitudes, and negative automatic thoughts - identified as key to Beck’s cognitive theory
appeared more frequently in the inner experience of depressed individuals as compared to
nondepressed individuals.
Only the depression construct showed a statistically significant difference between
the depressed and nondepressed groups. However, all of the other constructs showed at
least a large effect size in the expected direction. These large effect sizes suggest that if
this study had a larger sample size, the other differences on the other constructs might
have been significant as well. Nonetheless, the large effect sizes in the expected direction
lend some support to the notion that the constructs associated with Beck’s Cognitive
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Theory are found more often in depressed participants’ experiences than nondepressed
participants’ experiences.
Within the depressed participants’ sampled moments there appeared to be numerous
depressive thoughts related to past incidents of failures, tragic accidents, or being
emotionally hurt by significant people fi-om their life. There were also future projected
themes o f depression evident within depressed participants’ thought content such as the
inability to meet future expectations, negative projections about themselves, and negative
projections o f future events. These experiences were consistent with the cognitive triad
construct developed by Beck (1964), which indicated that depressed individuals
experienced negative thoughts about themselves, their future, and their world. These
findings are also consistent with Cavenagh’s (2003) study in which she found support for
the cognitive triad between depressed and nondepressed participants. Thus, evidence of
Beck’s cognitive theory of depression can be found in momentary experiences of
depressed individuals.
In determining whether or not the four constructs related to the momentary
experiences converged with the self-report questionnaire data assessing central constructs
in Beck’s cognitive theory of depression, I correlated the average ratings o f each
construct for each individual with their corresponding self-report questionnaire score.
Depression, the cognitive triad, and negative automatic thoughts converged with their
corresponding self-report questionnaire score, while dysfunctional attitudes narrowly
missed reaching significance. This provides evidence of convergent validity between
Beck’s central constructs found in DES and the corresponding self-report questionnaires
regarding Beck’s cognitive theory of depression.
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Although the four constructs from Beck’s cognitive theory o f depression were rated
as occurring more frequently in depressed individuals, these four individual components
did not appear to be distinct from one another. It often was the case that multiple
components of Beck’s theory were rated as present within a moment o f experience and
the ratings were highly intercorrelated across moments of experience. This may have
occurred because I didn’t do a sufficient job describing the constructs to the raters.
Therefore the raters may have lacked precision when they rated the moments. These
results also might have occurred because the constructs have fundamentally fuzzy
boundaries when they are applied to actual moments of experience.
There was also evidence o f a lack o f distinctness between overall questionnaire scores
because o f the high correlations between the questionnaires. Thus there was little
evidence that the convergence was due to variance unique to the individual constructs.
Rather it appeared that there might have been a unitary underlying dimension accounting
for the strength of these relationships. Thus although there is evidence for convergence
of self-report questionnaires and the nature of the momentary experiences, it appeared to
be more attributable to a global underlying dimension of depression than to the more
narrow constructs delineated in Beck’s cognitive theory of depression.
Finally, these results provided evidence of convergent validity for DES. The
questionnaires used in this study all have an extensive history of validation. Thus the
high degree of correspondence observed between the ratings o f the moments of
experience obtained via DES and the questionnaires indicates that DES produces valid
descriptions o f ongoing experience.
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Present Study Limitations
The present study had a number of limitations. First, the sample size was small. The
DES procedure is time consuming by nature and thus a larger sample size would have
required more resources than were available to the researcher. It is possible that these
individuals may differ in some systematic or non-systematic manners from the
population. Additionally, a larger sample may have revealed other types of experiences
related to depression and it would have provided more statistical power for comparisons
between the groups.
Another limitation of the study was the population the participants were selected
from. The participants were selected from the college population. Thus the results may
only generalize to the college population and may not generalize to the wider population.
A third limitation of the study was the limited number o f experiences that were
collected. Only four days worth of moments were collected and this may not provide an
actual representation of the daily life of the individual. Essentially I collected 24 seconds
of the participant’s life, which seems like a small amount of time. Nonetheless these few
moments o f experience from this relatively small sample were sufficient to reveal a
number of meaningful differences between the groups and to uncover significant
convergence among the moments of experience and the self-report questionnaires.
A fourth limitation of the study was that observed variability in experience may have
been due to differences in condition under which people sampled. Participants were free
to collect their experiences at their convenience. This may have led to systematic
differences in the conditions under which the depressed and nondepressed participants
chose to sample.
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A fifth limitation o f the study was that the operational definition of the constructs
associated with Beck’s cognitive theory may have been imprecise. Quite possibly with
more training or better definitions we could obtain more distinctiveness between the
constructs.
A sixth limitation of the study was that the researcher was not blind to the group
membership of the participants. Being blind to the participants’ group membership
proved to be impossible because the symptoms o f depression were easily observable in
the presentation o f the participants.
A seventh potential limitation o f the study was that the researcher used the data
gathered on the first day. Often DES studies discard the first day of sampling data
because the first sampling meeting is considered part of the participants’ training.
However, an informal comparison of the data from the sampling days indicated there was
sufficient similarity in experiences across days to use the data from the first day.
An eight limitation of this study is that the researcher has not been established as a
reliable reporter of experience via DES. To gain experience in the DES procedure, the
researcher has participated in multiple training interviews with the creator o f DES, Dr.
Russell Hurlburt, and a well-established DES investigator. Dr. Christopher Heavey. He
also studied DES procedure by reading books authored by Dr. Hurlburt and Dr. Heavey,
participated in DES laboratory meetings, and transcribed DES interviews done by Dr.
Heavey. To minimize this limitation. Dr. Heavey sat in on some o f the interviews.
Additionally, Dr. Heavey and Dr. Hurlburt viewed some of the videos of DES interviews
and concluded that the researcher employed DES appropriately.
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A ninth limitation o f the study is that the researcher has not established reliability
with regard to written descriptions of the experience. In order to maximize the reliability
of the description o f experience the researcher collaborated with the participant after each
experience had been described. Dr. Heavey then reviewed each written description of
experience. The researcher has gained experience with regard to written descriptions by
writing descriptions o f participants’ sampled moments while participating in training
interviews with Dr. Heavey and Dr. Hurlburt as previously discussed.
Additional evidence in support of the adequacy of the DES and written descriptions
comes from the fact that the frequency of the five most commonly occurring phenomena
of inner experience found in this study closely resembles the frequency observed by
Heavey and Hurlburt (2008). Further evidence that the researcher did an adequate job
with his written descriptions comes from the fact that the researcher’s characterization of
different subjects are different from each other, indicating that active presuppositions did
not lead to everyone’s inner experience as being described alike. The groups also came
out be different from each other on the ratings of the write-ups by the raters, indicating
the write-ups didn’t all say the same thing. These factors provide evidence that the
researcher adequately employed DES.
A tenth limitation of the study is that the researcher did the written descriptions of the
moments. These written descriptions were then given to the raters to rate. The
researcher may have unknowingly biased the written descriptions of the moments in
some systematic way.
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Suggestions for Future Research
Future studies should include replication of this study utilizing a larger sample
size. A second possibility would be to explore the amount of depressive content within
people who experience high levels of anxiety. A third recommendation would be to
explore the therapeutic benefits o f attempting to increase inner speech and decrease
feelings within depressed individuals. A fourth recommendation would be to do a long
term study focusing on determining whether or not distorted cognitive schemas - a
component of Beck’s cognitive theory - are evident in momentary experiences of
depressed individuals.
The last suggestion for future research comes from an observation resulting from the
DES procedure made by one of the participants. In this observation Sheila noticed the
difference between the frequency of depressive content she experienced during the first
sampling day and her subsequent days. Sheila claimed that she engaged in more
activities while sampling after her first sampling day. This led her to conclude that by
distracting herself she decreased the amount o f depressive thoughts in her experience.
This observation is consistent with Nolen-Hoeksema’s (1991) response styles theory that
suggests that depression is decreased by distracting responses to negative feelings and
increased by ruminative responses. It would be important to conduct a study to determine
if increased activities decrease the amount of depressive content in momentary
experiences o f depressed individuals.
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APPENDIX 1

QUESTIONNAIRES
Instructions: Rate each moment on a scale on the amount that the person displays the
target characteristic in the given moment. You will make 2 ratings for each moment, 1
rating per characteristic (below).
1. Depressive Content - The presence of affective (i.e., depressed mood, worthlessness,
guilt), behavioral (i.e., withdrawal, agitation), cognitive (i.e., difficulty concentrating,
thinking, or making decisions), and physical (i.e., insomnia or hypersomnia, fatigue)
aspects of depression.
0
Not
at All

1

2
Slightly

3

4
Quite
aBit

5

6
Extremely

2. Negative View - A negative view of the self, world, or future.
0
Not
at All

1

2
Slightly

3

4
Quite
aBit

5

6
Extremely

3. Dysfimctional Attitudes -Attitudes such as negative conclusions without support; a
focus on negative content in a situation while disregarding the rest o f the context;
assumptions o f failure in the future; and distorted patterns of thinking involving
minimizing positive aspects o f self or experiences or inflating the importance of negative
aspects of the self or experience.

0
Not
at All

1

2
Slightly

3

4
Quite
a Bit

5

6
Extremely

4. Negative Thoughts - Thoughts about worthlessness, hopelessness, past failures, or
general self-derogatory beliefs or statements.
0

1

2

3
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4

5

6

Not
at All

Slightly

Quite
a Bit

Extremely

5. Valence - The overall negativity versus positivity of the experience.
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Extremely
Quite
Slightly
Neutral
Slightly
Quite
Extremely
Negative
a bit
Negative
Positive
a bit
Positive
Negative
Positive
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A PPEN D IX 2

SAMPLED MOMENTS
1. She was downstairs in her house and walking to the laundry room. She was
holding a hanger with her left hand, but wasn’t really paying attention to any of
the sensory aspects of the hanger. She was seeing the bright whiteness of the door
in front of her. She was seeing the top of the door and noticing the whiteness
around the rectangular shape that is indented in the door.
2. She was in her room, blow-drying her hair. She was looking in the mirror and
holding her hairbrush in her right hand, which was holding her hair, and she was
holding the blow dryer in her left hand. She was seeing her hair on her brush and
it was blowing. She was also singing a song in her head. She was singing a song
called “I’m going to buy you a drink,” by T Pain. She was singing the words
“I’m going to buy you a drink” in her head in a normal voice.
3. He had just gotten out of his shower and opened the bathroom door and saw his
roommate. He saw his roommate’s head and his hand to his chin and he looked
interested in the TV show that he was watching. He knew that he was watching a
show about tornadoes. He was wondering which part of the show was he
watching. He was seeing an image of a tornado in his head. At the bottom of the
image were big fat letters going from left to right of the word “tornado.” Above
the word image was a big, gray tornado. The sky behind the tornado was gloomy
and black. The tornado image was moving from right to left.
4. She was getting ready for the day. She was feeling upset/mad because her boss
had woken her up via phone in the morning. He had called her to come into work
early that day. She wondered why he couldn’t have called her the night before and
why did he have to call me so early. She also felt happy/worried because she was
noticing her smile and that her boyfriend had not called her. She was wondering
why she is smiling when she should be upset. She also thought that she would
think about it later and that she needed to shower.
5. He was text messaging “I love you” to his girlfriend. He was at the word “love” in
the text message when the beep went off. He was experiencing a mental image of
his girlfriend’s face. Her mouth was moving into a smile. The image was in a
black background and there were blue/reddish colors. The background was faded.
He was aware of thinking that he loved her and knew that she loved him. In
addition he had a feeling of overwhelming sensation o f happiness in his whole
body.
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6. He was talking to his sister on the phone. She was describing a pagoda in
Thailand. He was experiencing a visual image o f a pagoda. It was three stories
tall and predominantly red with blue trim and a curved roof. He was focused on
the upper part o f the pagoda. This image seemed to be in his head.
7. He was emailing a connection of his who lives in the Philippines. He was typing
about his alcoholic past. He was feeling remorse and sadness. He describe this
feeling as a huge sense of despondency. It was accompanied by a nauseous
feeling in his stomach. He also had an image of a head-on car crash viewed from
the side from about 50 feet away. In his image the cars were just coming into
contact; this image is a reconstruction of a crash he was involved in years ago
while he was driving drunk. He doesn’t remember the details o f the crash
because he was drunk, but this is the image he has recreated of what he thinks it
was like. The cars in his image were generic and lacked details such as color.
8. He was watching the 3-6 music video. He was focused on one of the singer’s
teeth. He saw dark silver grills that were spaced apart. He was focused on the top
row of teeth and top lip. He was noticing that his teeth are spaced apart more than
usual. He was wondering how does he get chicks.
9. He was eating a subway sandwich in his room. He was looking at the peppers in
his sandwich and was noticing the yellowness of the peppers. He describes the
pepper’s yellow color to be similar to that of light colored urine. At the moment
o f the beep he could also taste in his mouth a hot mild sensation from eating the
peppers. The sensation was tingly, and was experienced on the right comer of his
lips and his tongue.
10. He was walking to a class and listening to his friend talk about an upcoming fight
on the weekend. His friend was saying “I got a fight this weekend.” There was
sunlight in his face. He could feel himself squinting his eyes because of the
sunlight. More specifically, he noticed it more in his left eye that was a slight
squeeze.
11. He was looking at a picture of one of his friends on facebook.com. He was
thinking that his friend had a really weird haircut and was saying to hirnself in his
head “what a weird haircut.” He was also seeing the picture and saw the guy’s
head and saw blonde hair hanging down covering his forehead. The guy in the
picture was also making a goofy face. The rest of the picture was dark purple and
black. He was feeling at a low level the experience o f shock. It was experienced
in the back of his head.
12. He was driving his car and listening to the radio. He had just heard a funny story
from the radio hosts. He was grinning and laughing and this was experienced in
his upper stomach on his left side a bit smaller than a fist. He had a feeling of
funny and lightly relaxed by not being tense, like a nice aura throughout his body.
He also was having mental laughter and just knowing that the story was really
funny and that something that just happened was funny. He knew he was
laughing and it was residual from the story.
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13. She was in her room on her computer looking at myspace.com. She was thinking
to herself that she needed to check her other email account. She knew that it was
rebel mail that she needed to check and that she was reminding herself.
14. He was eating a pickle in his kitchen. He was thinking to himself, which is better
Klauson or Kameki deli pickles. He was also experiencing the crunching of the
pickle in his teeth. He could also taste the sourness o f the pickle.
15. He was on his couch and daydreaming about school. He was wondering how
different it would be if his girlfriend went to school with him. He experienced a
moving image of him walking with his girlfriend with his arm around her side on
the pathway walking down the walkway between the library and the CDC trailers.
He was focused on him and his girlfriend with the library and random people
faded in the background. They were both wearing jeans and a black shirt with
their bags. He was on the left of her and saw this scene as if he they were moving
a little bit slower. In addition, he saw the scene as if he was rotating from the left
to front to right for 180 degrees.
16. He was about to shave. He was saying to himself in his head “I’m going to cut
my pimple.” He saw an image of just his upper lip to nose. He saw hair and one
pimple. The pimple was located on the left o f his upper lip. The image was as if
it was zoomed in and appeared large. He saw black hair with no background.
17. She was on her bedroom floor, going through her dresser and throwing away old
papers from high school. She had found her cookbook and was noticing the royal
blue color of the cover of the cookbook. The cover also had stars on it. She was
thinking to herself, that this is her cookbook, that there are only two recipes in it,
and that she was also remembering the history she had with the cookbook.
18. She was in her bathroom, brushing her teeth. She was looking in the mirror and
noticing herself brushing her teeth. She was seeing the toothbrush (mechanical)
and watching the toothbrush go across the top and bottom rows of her teeth. She
also tasted a strong taste of cinnamon toothpaste in her mouth. She tasted it on
her tongue.
19. He was with his dad thinking about what gift to give his dad for his birthday. He
saw an image from the person point of view of his dad receiving the gift. He
saw his dad in the center of the image at a table. To the left and right of the dad
were 24 family members. His dad had his hand stretched out receiving the gift.
His dad opened the birthday bag, but before he could see in the bag the vision
ended. He was focused on seeing his uncle on his dad’s right, his mom on the
dad’s left, grandma on mom’s left, and everybody else was faded. There was a
black background and shades of blue, gray, and green in the scene. However, his
grandma was wearing orange. He could also feel excitement in his upper body
that was experienced as blood rushing through his veins.
20. He was watching TV in his bedroom. He was flipping through channels and
ended up on the series called “workout.” He was feeling anxious which was
associated with the sensation of “butterflies” in the left side of his stomach. He
was watching a scene of girls being touchy feely.
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21. He had just gotten out of his shower. Two of his friends had left and one of his
friends was supposed to come back. He was looking down his spiral staircase in
anticipation of seeing one o f his friends come back. He was seeing his marble
floor, but was focused on a vivid sky blue color on the floor. He was having a
feeling of urgency and frustration that was experienced as a strong tenseness in
his shoulders and neck. Part of the feeling was wondering where was his friend
was, and thinking that he had to leave and she wasn’t there.
22. He was riding the bus on his way to ride his bike in Red Rock canyon. He was
thinking about stopping to get refreshments. At the moment of the beep he was
thinking about what he wanted to drink. He was debating between multiple sports
drink and the amount of carbohydrates. He was going to pick the one with the
least amount of carbohydrates.
23. He was at home text messaging his girlfriend and thinking about how much his
girlfriend means to him. He had a thought about how he wouldn’t be who he is if
she didn’t make him who he was. He had a feeling of happiness.
24. He was listening to his sociology teacher. He was focused on looking at him.
The teacher was walking back and forth, pacing. He was listening to his professor
say “in a culture of that sort.” He was seeing his professor sideways to the right.
He was seeing him from his elbows to his face. He had a pointer (projector
clicker) in his left hand. He also could see chairs with nobody in them and that
was sort of blurry.
25. He was sitting on his couch watching TV. He had a mental image of his
girlfriend smiling and hearing “I love you.” He was hearing her say it in her
voice but a little bit quieter than normal volume. The image that he experienced
was o f her face and her mouth was moving towards a smile. He saw from the top
of her head down to her neck. He saw it from his own perspective and saw her
face as a light shade o f blue and her hair as brown and blue. The background was
black and he experienced this in his head.
26. He was on his couch and was excited about spending time with his girlfriend
tomorrow. He was feeling a presence of excitement throughout his whole body. It
felt like a pendulum swinging from the bottom of his body up. The pendulum
was moving like a bouncing ball and ended at his heart. It felt really good like a 9
out of 10.
27. He was getting all his stuff together to leave his friend’s dorm room. He was
looking for his wallet prior to the beep. He was saying out loud “how the hell did
it get here?” in an inquisitive /suspicious voice. He was feeling dread because he
was leaving and he didn’t want to go home. He was feeling in his whole stomach
a slight sensation of butterflies related to the dreadful feeling.
28. He was reading a text from his girlfriend saying that when she thinks of him, she
smiles. He had a good feeling, like everything was perfect. It felt like a lifting
feeling, like negative thoughts went away. He also had an idea o f thinking o f her
and understanding why she would be smile.
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29. He was typing up a research paper. He was typing the word “singularity,” but he
was not really paying attention to typing. He was saying to himself in his head, “I
got to get this done.” He was feeling worried and this was experienced as
coldness throughout his body. This feeling was connected to thinking about
trying to get his paper done and being eager to get his paper done. He was feeling
tense in his shoulders and neck. He was also feeling anxious that was
experienced as butterflies in his stomach.
30. He was in his theater room. He was feeling dread because all he wanted to do
was just chill, relax, and sit and watch TV. He had to leave for an appointment.
He was looking at the TV screen and MTV was on. He was not focused on
anything in particular. He felt like he was staring through the screen and noticing
the color red.
31. He was working at his restaurant. A couple came into the restaurant. The girl
was really hot and wearing very revealing clothes. He had dropped salsa when he
was trying to bring them chips. He was having an image of seeing the guy get up
from his table and coming over to him and saying “why you checking my girl.”
He saw this from the 1®*person perspective. He could see the guy from his shorts
up. The guy had a lot of tattoos, a red muscle shirt, and black, red, white swim
trunks. The guys face looked mad with his eyebrows together. The girl was in
the background smiling at him. The guy walked past three tables. He was
thinking that the girl was wondering why would he want to get his ass kicked and
he was hoping the guy didn’t think he was checking out his girl.
32. She was in her room doing her homework. She had just finished reading a
newspaper article prior to the beep. She was thinking about the article and Harry
Reid. More specifically, she was thinking that he was an idiot. This was
experienced in her head.
33. He was getting ready to get into the shower. He was in his room sitting down.
The beep went off and he had no experience.
34. She was watching a movie in her bedroom. She was thinking that she liked the
girl’s outfit on the show. She was focused on the girl in the movie and saw her
from head to toe. The girl had a dark blue/dark green plaid jacket. She was
seeing an image o f herself in her head wearing the exact same outfit. She saw her
whole body with a green tank top and wearing the same jacket. The jacket was
open in the image. She also had dark blue jeans and white/gray puma sneakers
on. She thought that she looked good in that jacket in the image in her head.
35. He was downstairs eating dinner. He was noticing food in his mouth, which
tasted good, and he was enjoying it. He was feeling worried that was experienced
as tension in his neck and shoulders. This feeling of worry also was linked to a
loss of appetite in his stomach. He knew that he couldn’t eat all of his food, that
his stomach was sick, empty but full, and felt like it was going down a roller
coaster. Before the current moment he had text messaged a friend. At the
moment of the beep, he was wondering when he would receive a text message
from his friend.

134

36. He was talking to his mom about AFLAC insurance. He was thinking it was a
good amount they were giving him for a short-term disability. He was speaking
to his mom and saying, “this was a good amount.” He felt his shoulders through
his head being lighter which was attributed to happiness.
37. He was eating chips on his couch. He was pondering what was due on Tuesday.
He was thinking quickly through his mind about classes, tests, quiz, work, what
teacher said, and what was due on Tuesday. He experienced this in his head.
38. She was watching “Happy Feet” the movie at her home with her little cousin. She
was feeling really silly and was in the process o f picking on her cousin. The beep
hit when she was in the middle of reaching over to poke her cousin. She saw on
the TV screen two little penguins swimming close together in light blue water.
The background had dark blue water and icebergs.
39. He was studying with a lot of focus on his biology test. He had an image in his
head of bond angles of hydrogen and molecular genetics. More specifically, it
was a 3D image o f red, yellow, and purple ribbons of protein folded in a special
way of hydrogen bond.
40. She was on her computer in her room looking at myspace.com. She was looking
at her cousin’s website. There was a picture o f two guys making out and her
cousin’s comment on the screen was “this is hot.” She was saying to herself in
her head, “my cousin is freaking weird.” She was saying this in a shocked voice.
41. He was at his work and was sitting down thinking about the psychology quiz he
was going to have that day. He was seeing an image of himself sitting at a gray
desk. In his mental image he could see on his desk a sheet of papers tacked to his
left and one sheet in front of him. He saw grape juice on his right side and he
could barely make out a piece o f bread on a napkin in front of him. He saw his
back with a white shirt and boxers. The background had a window with brown
shudders and shades of blue on the wall. He was also wondering how he is going
to do on the quiz, if he had time to study, and if he had studied enough.
42. He was standing on his staircase talking to his dad. He was saying out loud
“Buffalo Wild Wings would be a good place to have a pool table.” He was having
a visual image o f where to put the pool table. He saw a wooden room with two
wooden pool tables with black cloth on them. The room was dark and it was
viewed from the person perspective.
43. She was in her room sitting down looking at her nails. She wasn’t focused on her
nails; instead she was focused on her thoughts. She was trying to justify her
selfishness by balancing it out by doing something else. She was thinking about
bringing a child into the world at the moment of the beep and that that would
make her selfless. The selfless realization came after the beep.
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44. He was in his room and was thinking to himself he hopes his roommate doesn’t
spray an air freshener. He was seeing an image o f a bottle that looked like the air
freshener. The bottle was white with green leaves on it. The cap was light green.
He also saw a separate image of a lime to the right of the bottle. The lime was
smaller than the bottle and was seen as green. He was also having a gassy
sensation in his stomach. It was felt in his lower stomach and it was about the
size of a volleyball. He was sensing the tightness of it.
45. He was saying goodbye to his girlfriend at his truck. He was seeing sadness in
her eyes, which crushes his heart. He felt bad, crushed, and disappointed in
himself.
46. He was taking his test and was in the middle of answering a question that he was
confident in. He felt good, happy, and joyful all over his body. He also could see
himself in a room with his parents. They were all talking but with no sound. He
saw this scene from behind himself and looking at his parents. He could see
everybody from the waist up. He was about 3-4 feet away. The mom was on the
left, TV in the background, no boundaries in the scene, and his parents were
smiling. He could see his mom’s lips moving and he could lip-read her saying
“studying paid off.” He thought he was showing his parents he was doing well
and that they were happy.
47. He was using a computer. He was trying to connect to wireless, but it wouldn’t
work. He felt angry. He felt a mini heat burst in his forehead area. He saw
himself in a black scene with a spotlight on him from the front view. He was
wearing black trousers and a burgundy polo shirt. He saw his lips moving and
hearing himself say “why are you so retarded, why did you buy the cheap
computer.” He was seeing the scene as if he was moving around it in 360 degrees.
48. He was reading a story in the New York Times about Elizabeth Edwards. He was
her having cancer and the fact that she was still smiling. This thought was
represented by an image of her smiling face with a “twinkle in her eye.” He only
saw her face, which was in appropriate colors.
49. He was lying down on his bed and was starting to fall asleep. He was feeling his
arms and legs were relaxed and there was lightness between his thighs and calves
on both legs. He was also noticing looseness from his shoulders through wrist
and was centralized in his biceps and wrists. His head was on his pillow and he
was feeling the softness of the pillow on the back of his head and his neck. He
described it as having a chi in flow with the pillow.
50. He was in his classroom sitting down. He had just received his test score back.
He was experiencing a feeling of excitement. He was happy and shocked for
receiving a 100 on the test when he was thinking that he was not going to do well
on the exam. He was also feeling adrenaline in his stomach on his left side that
was intense. It felt like a burst of energy the size of a cantaloupe and was warm.
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